Business system improvements through recognition of process variability by Miller, Michael P. (Michael Parker)
Business System Improvements Through
Recognition of Process Variability
by
Michael P. Miller
BS Chemical Engineering, University of Florida, 1988
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management
and the Department of Chemical Engineering
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of
Master of Science in Management
and
Master of Science in Chemical Engineering
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June 1997
@ 1997 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, All rights reserved
Signature of Author
Sl an School of MBnagement
Department of Chemical Engineering
May 15, 1997
Certified by
Stephen C. Graves, Professor
MIT Sloan School of Management
Certified by
Accepted by
Accepted by
Gregory J. McRae, Bayer Professor
Department of Chemical Engineering
Robert E. Cohen, St. Laurent Professor of Chemical Engineering
Chairman, Committee on Graduate Students
Larry Abeln, Director of Master's Program
Sloan School of Management
JUL 0 1 1991 Science
dl'- 1(

Business System Improvements Through
Recognition of Process Variability
by
Michael P. Miller
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management
and the Department of Chemical Engineering
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of
Master of Science in Management
and Master of Science in Chemical Engineering
ABSTRACT
Production planning and scheduling systems that do not recognize true process variability
will incur significant schedule disruption and require substantial inventories to maintain
customer service. When variability is misunderstood or ignored, significant differences
will exist between planned and actual utilization. This thesis analyzes the various forms
of process variability affecting the supply of usable wide roll from the Commercial Film
Flow sensitizing operation at Eastman Kodak Company. It evaluates the existing policies
used by this operation to accommodate these sources of variability. Then, through
statistical analysis, it provides improved methods for planning and scheduling production
and for determining inventory safety stock levels to reduce the impact of these sources of
variability. This work shows that by segmenting the sources of process variability into
three forms (common cause process, uncommon cause process, and test release), one can
design and implement planning, scheduling, and inventory stocking policies specifically
designed for each of these forms.
The financial benefits to the Commercial Film Flow Division and Eastman Kodak
Company through the implementation thus far of the concepts developed by this thesis
have been estimated by Eastman Kodak Company at the following: an approximate $7
million one-time reduction in wide roll inventory, an approximate $2 million annual
savings in carrying cost associated with the inventory reduction, and an approximate
$200,000 annual savings in planning resources. Additionally, it is believed there are
significant financial benefits to Eastman Kodak Company in lowered raw material
inventories due to reduced disruption transmitted upstream from the sensitizing schedule.
Thesis Supervisors: Stephen C. Graves, Professor of Management
Gregory J. McRae, Bayer Professor of Chemical Engineering
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1. Executive Summary
1.1 Thesis Statement
If consistent levels of high quality customer service are to be maintained in the presence
of process variability, then there needs to be a focus on inventories, capacity requirements
and cycle time. True variability reduction is often slow and tedious because it requires an
increased scientific understanding of the products, processes, and their interaction. This
work hypothesizes that the planning, scheduling, and safety stocking can be optimized to
minimize the impact of process variability on the supply chain.
This thesis will determine and quantify the major sources of process and test variability in
the sensitizing operation of Kodak Commercial Film Manufacturing Flow. The thesis
then will seek to reduce the impact of the most significant sources of this variability by
means of changes in the business system. These changes will consist of improvements in
production planning, scheduling, and inventory policies; changes to the information flow;
and other means that can be addressed directly. The thesis also will provide a process by
which manufacturing can continue to evaluate the sources of variability to ensure that the
planning, scheduling and inventory policies accommodate the most current performance
data.
1.2 Problem Description
To understand the problems experienced by the Kodak Commercial Film Manufacturing
Flow Division (hereafter referred to as the CFM Flow), one must have some
understanding of the system they use for planning and scheduling their manufacturing
activities. The CFM Flow uses a classical MRP II (Manufacturing Resources Planning)
planning and scheduling process. MRP II is the successor to material requirements
planning (MRP), a computer-based tool for scheduling and inventory control developed
by researchers at IBM.' Hopp and Spearman clearly stated the fundamental insight of
MRP:
Dependent demand is different from independent demand. Production to
meet dependent demand should be scheduled so as to explicitly recognize
its linkage to production to meet independent demand. 2
These authors define independent demand as any demand originating outside the system,
typically demand for finished products. They define dependent demand as demand for
the components making up these finished products. In an MRP system, each finished
product (and some intermediate products) has a bill of material (BOM) which defines by
quantity and type the components making up that finished product. The production
schedule for finished products flows directly from the master production schedule (MPS.)
The master production schedule determines net requirements for production by
subtracting current inventory and scheduled receipts from the gross demand.3 The MRP
system uses the BOM for each finished product as well as the lead times for materials
acquisition and individual manufacturing steps to specify component orders and
manufacturing starts. MRP II is an extension of MRP that takes into account some of the
problems of MRP such as schedule infeasibility due to both capacity constraints and
stochastic lead times.4
In the case of the CFM Flow, the schedule for sensitizing support with light-sensitive
materials (known as sensitizing) comes directly from the master production schedule. The
material components required for the operation are determined by bill of material and
scheduled by standard lead times. (The reason for making the sensitizing schedule flow
directly from the master production schedule instead of an activity scheduled by bill of
material will be explained shortly.) This product flow is subject to several sources of
Hopp, Wallace J., and Spearman, Mark L. Factory Physics- Foundations of Manufacturing Management.
Irwin Publishing, Chicago (1996), pp. 105.
2 ibid., page 106.
3 ibid., page 108.
4 ibid., page 130.
variability including supply, process, test, and demand variability in their common and
uncommon cause forms.5 Even so, in the interest of minimizing unit manufacturing costs
(UMC), the CFM Flow has sought high utilization (>90%) for the sensitizing process and
scheduled production runs accordingly. Unfortunately, the nature and magnitude of the
variability is such that the actual realized capacity of the process has been below the
anticipated capacity. This creates frequent schedule changes to ensure the products most
in need are being produced first. The CFM Flow has not had a well-devised planning
process for dealing with uncommon cause and common cause yield loss as determined at
the sensitizing machine or through follow-up testing. The lack of a statistically-based
planning process has caused frequent schedule changes in the near-term fixed production
schedule (known as the freeze zone), excessive planning and replanning out beyond the
near-term fixed production schedule, and appropriate safety stock levels of sensitized
wide roll. Individuals within the CFM Flow familiar with the problem and its impact
have estimated that a improved planning and scheduling policy with a statistical basis
could save from $2 million - $20 million /year depending on the degree of
implementation.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This work accomplishes the following:
* an understanding of the nature of the three forms of process variability
(common cause process, uncommon cause process, and test release) that
impact availability of sensitized wide roll (Chapter 3.3 and 3.4)
* an understanding of the planning and scheduling phenomena being
experienced by the CFM Flow (Chapter 3.1)
s As explained earlier in the thesis, common cause refers to the day-to-day variation of an in-control
process whereas uncommon cause refers to variation with a special cause, occurring at a low frequency.
* a plan for dealing with special cause shortfall in yield of sensitized material.
The plan allocates undedicated machine time within the near-term fixed
production period of the sensitizing schedule just beyond the expedited lead
time for remanufacture of the components necessary to remake the sensitized
material in question. (Chapter 4.1)
* a statistically-based, and much simplified determination of safety stocks to
accommodate common cause yield variation incurred by all products being
sensitized. (Chapter 4.2)
* a statistically-based method for determining and accommodating wide roll test
release variation (time and quantity) in safety stock levels. (Chapter 4.3)
* a means of combining the various forms of variability to determine
appropriate safety stock levels. (Chapter 4.4)
* a method for combining these forms of variability with demand variability to
set wide roll safety stock levels and for freezing larger portions of the wide
roll production schedule to allow for reductions in upstream raw material
inventory (Chapter 4.4)
1.4 Specific Contributions of this Thesis
The following are actual realized benefits of this work to Eastman Kodak Company:
* a reduction in sensitized wide roll safety stocks (implemented: estimated to be
a one-time reduction of $7 million and an annual savings in carrying cost on
this inventory of $2 million.)
* a reduction in planning and scheduling resources due to the machine time
allocated for rerunning products suffering significant yield loss (implemented:
estimated to be an annual savings of $200,000.)
In addition, there is the potential for major reductions in raw material inventory
levels resulting from the freedom to enlarge the fixed portion of the sensitizing
schedule.
Finally, since the impact of manufacturing process variability is universal, the
understanding and methodologies presented in this thesis can provide benefit to other
manufacturing operations as well.
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2. Kodak's Existing Manufacturing and Scheduling Process
2.1 Introduction
Kodak's largest film sensitizing facility is Kodak Park in Rochester, NY. Kodak Park's
film sensitizing business has two broad product classifications: consumer film and
commercial film. There has been an attempt to focus products in each of these two
businesses on specific equipment in the interest of matching product complexity with
process capability and maximizing overall equipment utilization. Even so, there is some
overlap in that any one machine produces a disproportionate mix of products from the
two classifications.
Both consumer and commercial film are produced by similar process flow. As Figure 1
shows, chemicals are synthesized at the initial steps of the process. Some of these
chemicals are produced internally (SynChem) while others are purchased from the
outside. These chemicals are combined with others in various formulas in an emulsion
manufacturing step to create emulsion. Support upon which the light-sensitive material
will be placed is also being produced in the early stages utilizing either cellulose acetate
(acetate) or ESTAR material.
Figure 1: Simplified film production process flow
Photosensitive emulsion is sensitized onto roll support in the sensitizing step to produce
sensitized wide roll. Wide rolls are manufactured in a variety of sizes depending on the
specific equipment and product characteristics. These wide rolls are then "finished" or
cut and packaged in a multitude of finished product formats.
As mentioned previously, the classical MRP system schedules finished products
independently and sets the requirements for components up the entire process flow based
on the finished product schedule. In Kodak Park's case, the wide roll sensitizing
schedule comes directly from the master schedule rather than being treated as a
component of finished product and being set by bill of material and standard lead time.
Chemicals, emulsion and roll support are produced according to the wide roll production
schedule and sensitized wide roll is finished in a "finish-to-order" or "final assembly
schedule" fashion based on actual orders and some amount of in-month production load
leveling. The reasons for making wide roll sensitizing process the focal point for the
master schedule will be discussed in Chapter 2.3.
2.2 Description of the Manufacturing Process for Commercial Film
Commercial film manufacturing differs from other categories primarily in the complexity
of the products manufactured and the length of production runs. A good measure for the
complexity or manufacturing difficulty of a particular product is the number of individual
layers of material that must be applied to the support. As the number of layers increases,
the potential for a host of problems increases dramatically as well. These problems
include undesirable layer interactions as well as reliable delivery of any one layer.
Individuals on the engineering staff of the CFM Flow developed a metric "Increasing
degree of difficulty" in an attempt to quantify product manufacturing difficulty. This
metric incorporates number of layers as well as other individual user specifications, and
contains a factor for product manufacturability. As Figure 2 shows, Commercial film
(B*) involves the manufacture of the most complicated products while the manufacture of
film in other product sectors (A*) is relatively simple.
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Figure 2: Manufacturability by product category
Differences in the value of this metric correlate with differences in machine efficiency,
product yield, unit cost and many other important measures.
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2.3 Current planning and scheduling policies used by the Kodak CFM Flow
A fairly detailed treatment the Kodak MRP II systems architecture is provided by
Kristopher L. Homsi in his thesis Information Flow and Demand Forecasting Issues in a
Complex Supply Chain.6 It is necessary here to understand how the wide roll sensitizing
operation is planned and scheduled and how this translates to production upstream.
Figure 3 is a graphical depiction of how sensitizing, finishing, and sensitizing
components are scheduled as described in Chapter 2.1. As the figure shows, the
forecasted demand signal drives the sensitizing production plan which is then
"assimilated" with projected finishing rates and adjusted to meet actual finishing usage.
Wide Roll
Inventory
MRP Signal MPS Signal Final Assembly
/ Schedule
Sales Forecast
Figure 3: Planning and Scheduling of Kodak Commercial Film Manufacturing
There are three major reasons for having the sensitizing schedule flow directly from the
sales forecast through the master production schedule. The most important reason is that
6 Homsi, Kristopher. LFM Masters Thesis: Information Flow and Demand Forecasting Issues in a Complex
Supply Chain. MIT Sloan School of Management, MIT Department of Chemical Engineering, (1995), pp.
19-22.
the number of different items produced by sensitizing is significantly smaller than the
number of finished good items. A single sensitized wide roll product can be finished into
numerous final formats, consequently master scheduling the finished format would
require substantial wide roll product inventories. Driving sensitizing operations purely
from actual finishing needs would require larger safety stocks of wide roll or significantly
more sensitizing capacity in order to maintain service levels to finishing. Wilson, in his
LFM masters thesis Determination of Optimal Safety Stock Levels for Components in an
Instant Film Assembly System, demonstrated the following: "For product line demands
which are not perfectly correlated, a reduction in inventory stock can be achieved by
holding the inventory in a form that 'pools' the product line demands into a single
family." 7 Statistically, consider finished products A, B, C, and D that each come from a
single wide roll and that are not perfectly correlated in demand. The following is true
about the standard deviation (a) of the demand for that wide roll and the a's of each
individual finished product: atot < GA + aB + aC + aD.8 Since safety stock inventory is
driven directly by a, the same relationship holds true for safety stock inventory.
The second reason is the relative speed and reliability of the sensitizing and finishing
operations. Whereas the sensitizing operation requires considerable lead-time (due to
component requirements and high utilization) and is somewhat unreliable in actual
product yield, finishing is relatively quick and much more reliable. Since reliable
component lead times and relatively unconstrained capacity of component-manufacturing
equipment are requirements for a well-functioning MRP system, treating sensitizing as a
component supplier and scheduling it by bill of material would cause significant
disruption. Related to this is the fact that sensitizing equipment is much more capital
intensive than finishing equipment. Since the component suppliers in an MRP system
'Wilson, John J. LFM Masters Thesis: Determination of Optimal Safety Stock Levels for Components in
an Instant Film Assembly System. MIT Sloan School of Management, MIT Department of Chemical
Engineering, (1996), page 39.
s ibid., page 38.
need to be less constrained in capacity than the operations they are supporting, it makes
financial sense that sensitizing is not scheduled as an MRP component supplier to
finishing through the bill of material.
There is a significant difference in the forecast-based/order-based scheduling balance for
sensitizing and finishing. Due to its minimal lead-time and higher reliability, finishing
has depended less on forecast than sensitizing and therefore been affected less by demand
variability. Finishing strives to maintain a final-assembly schedule system which
recognizes the financial benefits of producing from as short a demand horizon as forecast
accuracy and internal cost will allow. These financial benefits flow from the
consideration of safety stock inventory due to demand variability and waste resulting
from product changeovers.
Within the 18 month OPAL (Operational Planning at the Aggregate Level) horizon, there
is a 12 week planning horizon for wide roll requirements which equates to a master
production schedule. The aggregate in OPAL refers to monthly sales expectations by
product emulsion family and finishing format.9 A planning horizon of 12 weeks is used
since this is the period over which a weekly, item level schedule is considered necessary
to ensure all required products will be sensitized as scheduled. Outside of this 12 weeks,
the system automatically plans and updates monthly production based on forecasts.
Inside of this 12 weeks, all planning changes require manual intervention by wide roll
planners. Manual intervention is considered necessary due to the need to consider
multiple uncertainties that the OPAL system is not designed to incorporate such as the
actual rate of wide roll test release. Primarily, wide roll planners compare the updated
finishing demand forecast for each individual wide roll product to its existing wide roll
inventory level. At the point where the forward weeks of supply drops below a designed
minimum level of projected inventory, a wide roll planner will schedule a wide roll
sensitizing "event" or production batch. Since these changes are considered outside the
9 ibid., page 37.
lead time of the component suppliers, they are believed to cause minimal disruption to
production. The appropriateness of this belief will be explored later in Chapter 3.2.
Inside the 12 week planning horizon, the first five weeks (current + four) are considered
fixed. When a particular week of planned production passes within this "frozen" zone,
changes can no longer be made by wide roll planners "arbitrarily" since they would
require action within the average lead times of the component suppliers. Changing the
component supply schedule within the manufacturing lead time of the components causes
significant disruption and cost due to overtime due to expedited production, excessive
waste due to sub-optimal lot sizing, and poor capacity utilization due to inadequate load
leveling. If a change is necessary to prevent a wide roll stockout or customer service
impact, the wide roll planner will circulate a form requesting a change in the fixed zone
which must be signed by the manager of the sensitizing unit, among others.
2.4 Sources of Variability in Fit-for-Use Wide Roll
A number of factors are seen as causes which necessarily precipitate changes to the wide
roll sensitizing production schedule. These factors can be divided into the following four
categories: component supply variability, sensitizing process variability, wide roll test
variability, and demand forecast variability. Although this thesis focuses on the analysis
and treatment of process and test variability, an explanation of each category of variation
is helpful in understanding the operation.
A "sawtooth" diagram provides a good frame for describing the macro sources of
variability. As depicted in Figure 4 the left-hand vertical side of any individual "tooth"
represents a sensitizing event and the target footage for that event. At a constant finishing
rate, wide roll inventory represents a specific amount of footage. The right-hand sloped
side of the "tooth" represents depletion of the wide roll inventory by the downstream
finishing operation. Ideally with no variation in production or usage (and 0 test time,) the
new sensitizing event would occur at the exact moment that the available footage reached
zero. However, the existence of variation requires that some safety stock be maintained
to avoid stockouts.
process variability (% actual
realized footage from event)
Wide roll
inventory
--. I
'-.
scheduled
coating event
rate of consumption
by finishing
safety stock
(inventory I
minimum) demand variability:
component supply
variability
: Time
test release time
variability (lead time
to x% conforming)
Figure 4: Sources of variability in fit-for-use sensitized wide roll quantity
Two sources of variability were not analyzed in this work: supply and demand variability.
Component supply variability refers to uncertainty in the availability of fit-for-use
emulsion and roll support for the sensitizing operation. Although not studied in this
thesis, this is a source of change to the sensitizing schedule due to the relatively high
utilization of the component manufacturing equipment. Demand forecast variability
refers not to variation in demand specifically, but uncertainty in the accurate prediction of
fluctuating demand. The sensitizing operation is scheduled based on a finishing forecast
and inaccuracies in this forecast require safety stocks for buffering. Of these two sources
of variability, demand variability is by far more significant in terms of disruption to the
sensitizing schedule.
The source of variation studied most thoroughly in this thesis is sensitizing process
variability. This can take the form of day-to-day common-cause yield variation but can
also occur as significant, uncommon-cause yield loss. The latter is the result of what
Kodak refers to as an incident failure during a sensitizing event. An incident failure
situation refers to an infrequent incident at the sensitizing operation which requires the
run to be aborted or significant emulsion and support to be wasted as a result. In either
case, the end result is a significant shortfall in footage that cannot be characterized as part
of the normal distribution of outcomes.
From the limited analysis conducted by the author into the magnitude and impact of
demand variability, it would appear that this source is more disruptive to the sensitizing
schedule than process variability. This is in part a result not only of demand's higher
standard deviation but the fact that demand can vary both in quantity and time. Process
variability manifests primarily in quantity, whereas the start time of an event does not
vary as significantly from when it was originally scheduled. Knowing when a sensitizing
event will occur, a wide roll planner can be reasonably confident that some good product
will result from the event. Even if there is a shortfall in footage from the event, that
which is produced to specification can be used to satisfy demand until an adjustment to
the future sensitizing schedule can be made.
Although demand variability causes more disruption to the sensitizing schedule than
process variability, Kodak directed the author to focus on process variability. This was
due primarily to the fact that most felt there was more opportunity for understanding and
improving the response to process variability than for demand variability. Demand
variability comes from outside the CFM Flow, and therefore individuals inside the CFM
Flow have limited control over it.
With regard to incident failures, the planning system implicitly plans as if these don't
occur, even though they occur at a striking frequency. Data to support this supposition
will be provided in Chapters 3 and 4. Because products are scheduled when they are
needed, an incident failure creates an unplanned situation. When an incident failure is
discovered either at the machine or after testing, the planning team must create room in
the near-term schedule in order to fit the rescheduled event. Not only is the timing for
this typically less than the lead time of the components but it creates a "domino"
scheduling effect on other products that must be rescheduled to make way for the new
event. These new events many times must occur within the fixed zone of the schedule,
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.2. There is definite cost to this practice and it, at the
least, keeps the flow from making significant reductions in upstream inventories due to
the unreliability of the schedule. The near-term schedule disruption caused by incident
failures is similar to that created by non-standard downtime'l (NSDT) on the machine in
that each creates an immediate unexpected situation. The usual effect is that the time to
produce a certain product is longer than what the safety factors allow. Undedicated
capacity in each week's schedule can accommodate a considerable amount of these
extended runtimes, but when it is extreme, it can cause one week's schedule to spill into
the next week. This then creates the need to reprioritize the scheduling of many events.
In the case of common cause yield variation, there is the temptation to make changes in
the plan out beyond the fixed zone as a result of each event's outcome whether in control
or not. This practice also limits the extent to which uncertainty passed upstream to raw
material suppliers can be dampened by inventory management. Part of the policy
proposed by this thesis will address when changes should and should not be made and
what safety stock levels are necessary to allow the planning team this confidence.
1o The sensitizing schedule includes some undedicated capacity to allow for standard downtime on the
machine such as would be required standard product changeovers and standard quality checks at the
beginning of sensitizing events. Non-standard downtime refers to that downtime on the machine which is
the result of unexpected occurrences such as significant quality problems or an excessively long product
changeover. This non-standard downtime shifts the timing of all subsequent scheduled events and
therefore requires the schedule to be updated.
Test time and test yield variation (referred to collectively as test variability) are the other
sources of variability which have a significant impact on the sensitizing schedule. The
product staff tries to qualify just-sensitized wide roll promptly for use by finishing.
However, this work must be coordinated with the other priorities of the product staff such
as work on new products, improvements on existing products, and trial runs. The
disconnect in the scheduling process is that the sensitizing of wide roll is planned and
scheduled but it is fit-for-use wide roll that is needed by finishing. Due to the wide
variability in test time and yield, wide roll planners at times feel compelled to reschedule
new events for products that have not made it out of testing in a timely fashion. Test
variability will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.3. This thesis will also respond to the
need for statistically-based decision tools around when events should be rescheduled and
when safety lead time and safety stock should be adjusted to minimize the need for
unnecessary rescheduling and unreasonable wide roll inventories.
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3. General Findings and Analysis
3.1 The schedule loading disparity or "scheduling bow wave"
The term "scheduling bow wave" and the concept it represents were new to the author
when he arrived at Kodak for the internship and do not seem to pervade planning and
scheduling culture as a whole. (The scheduling bow wave refers to a machine production
schedule with a higher planned utilization in the near future than in the distant future. A
further description for and the causes of this phenomena for the Kodak CFM Flow will be
given in the remainder of this chapter.) The author found no other reference to this term
or phenomenon in any published literature and only one reference in unpublished
company internal literature. An instruction program entitled "Supply Chain Analysis-
Managing Uncertainty" created by Greg Kruger of Hewlett Packard (HP), Colorado
Springs, CO was the only non-Kodak source describing a "perpetual near-term wave" and
"problems associated with running a bow wave."'' Through correspondence with Mr.
Kruger, the author learned that HP's bow wave was caused by their
"planning organization intentionally loading their systems with build plans
higher than their real expectations for customer demand. The reason
planing did this was to create a buffer of extra inventory to handle the
inevitable uncertainty of what demand would be." 12
As mentioned, the author found no reference to the scheduling concept implied by the
term bow wave. However, from this point forward, the thesis author will use the term
"schedule loading disparity" (or just "disparity" when close in reference to "schedule
loading disparity") to describe the bow wave. Although this new term is not fully
descriptive of the bow wave phenomena, the reader is asked to associate this term with
what the bow wave term represents.
The HP schedule loading disparity differs from that experienced by the Kodak CFM
Flow in one major aspect: the HP planning organization uses the disparity intentionally,
" Kruger, Greg. "Supply Chain Analysis- Managing Uncertainty." Hewlett-Packard publication, 7/17/96.
12 Kruger, Greg. Electronic mail sent to author on 3/31/97.
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whereas the Kodak disparity is a result of not understanding and properly accommodating
the variability that impacts the sensitizing operation. This will be explained in further
detail in Chapter 3.1. However, whether it exists intentionally or unintentionally, a
schedule loading disparity causes problems to the organization. In his instruction
program, Mr. Kruger lists distrust between planning & procurement and suboptimal
inventory levels as the most significant problems created by their schedule loading
disparity. They have realized the inadequacy of this policy and have moved to a
statistically-based scheduling policy, similar to what is being used by Kodak CFM Flow,
and what this thesis intends to improve.
Figure 5 provides a qualitative representation of Kodak's schedule loading disparity. The
shape of the curve implies the continual heavy front loading in a schedule which
decreases over future time.
Planned
Loading
Now Future
Time
Figure 5: Schedule loading disparity or "scheduling bow wave"
For the purposes here, the author will only deal with the schedule loading disparity as it
relates to manufacturing planning and scheduling, but the concepts are transferable to any
set of planned and scheduled activities.
The fundamental root cause for a schedule loading disparity as described is the difference
between what an entity predicts it will accomplish and how long it will take, and, what it
actually does accomplish and how long it actually does take. This description is at the
heart of the need to understand the true performance variability and bias in any plan or
schedule. The projected plan determines resource allocation, short-term capital decisions,
maintenance schedules, and a host of other activities. Disrupting these after an intention
or commitment to execute is costly and frankly demotivating to those involved. Future
plans should reflect past performance accurately and should not be an unrealistic
representation of anticipated learning or assume variability that is lower than what
actually exists. An understanding of the nature of the difference between anticipated and
demonstrated performance is critical to making plans that are both feasible and cost-
effective. 13 One study of rationality in expected performance for production stated:
The management of the firms have both preference for and are personally
committed to a higher production...In their attempt to predict the future
production, the management will assume normal operating conditions and does
not take account of unusual conditions such as machine breakdown, delivery
delays...which lower future production...The "over optimism" bias is furthermore
hypothesized to increase with the uncertainty of production measured by its
variance. 14
The last sentence above seems appropriate to the CFM Flow given the relatively high
frequency of incident failures and the significant common cause variability. In classical
capacity planning, one does not make allowances for "all or nothing" yield loss and
usually underestimates the inherent variability. As production continues, it seems natural
that expectations for successful production will be overly optimistic and result in a bow
wave.
'3 An example of the lack of understanding by an organization experiencing a scheduling bow wave is the
tendency to conclude that although the plan may seem infeasible over the next x number of time periods,
once the organization gets beyond this, the plan should be feasible. Without fixing the root causes of the
bow wave though, this improvement in schedule feasibility will not occur.
14 Madsen, Jakob Brochner. "Test of rationality versus an 'over optimist' bias." Journal of Economic
Psychology, 15 (1994) 587-599.
3.1.1 Root causes of the schedule loading disparity
In a discussion early in the internship with a material supply manager about the drivers of
the schedule loading disparity, the manager mentioned four root causes:
1. Product variation- occurs when at least one of the components, usually an
emulsion layer, is not performing well upon sensitizing. This problem is
discovered through testing during the initial stages of the production run and
usually results in an aborted run (i.e. little or no yield.)
2. Process variation- this can take the form of minor variation as in subtle
variations in pump speed or significant variation as in air entrainment in a
liquid delivery system depositing bubbles onto the wide roll. The latter most
likely results in an unplanned stop of the sensitizing machine to allow liquid
lines to be purged of air. The act of shutting down and starting up the
machine consumes a fair amount of emulsion and support which would
otherwise be transformed into sensitized wide roll.
3. Wide rolls found by testing to be unusable- this quantity, referred to as shrink,
is wide roll that was not scrapped at the sensitizing machine but has failed
post-production qualification.
4. Timing of disposition of wide roll, the quality of which is uncertain- this is
variation in the testing time for determining the ultimate disposition of
sensitized wide roll.
This thesis combines product and process variation since their existence isn't discovered
until sensitizing begins and since they have the same effect of causing a shortfall in yield
for a sensitizing event. Wide rolls found by testing to be unusable and timing of wide roll
disposition have also been combined into test variation. The difficulties of dealing with
uncertainty in both quantity and time will be addressed later in the thesis. Although not
mentioned during the interview with the supply manager, there are also other causes of
the schedule loading disparity:
5. Demand variability- as mentioned earlier, this is essentially forecast accuracy.
It must be included as a root cause since it can result in unanticipated volume
being placed in the near-term sensitizing schedule.
6. Sensitizing bias- this represents the difference between the quantity of wide
roll that is intended to result from a certain quantity of components with no
variation and the quantity of wide roll that actually does result. If the CFM
Flow runs a continual negative bias, then it will forever be needing to make up
the difference between the target footage and the actual long-term mean
footage.
7. Demand bias- analogous to sensitizing bias in that it represents the long-run
average difference between the predicted demand and the actual demand. A
continual negative demand bias will also require near-term "overdrive."
3.1.2 The schedule loading disparity confirmed with data
Although sensitizing capacity plans developed by the capacity planner appeared to show
a schedule loading disparity over the future 12 weeks, the author sought to determine the
extent of its presence in weekly schedules. A technique developed by the thesis author
used the weekly twelve-week sensitizing production schedules from 2/28/96 to 10/10/96
as inputs. Week 20 through week 35 had complete data for each of the twelve weeks,
while the twelve weeks immediately prior to week 20 and the six weeks immediately
after week 35 had partial data. Figure 6 is a subset of the entire data set showing how the
data was handled.
Week of Date of
Schedule Schedule Week in future for which production is scheduled
Creation Creation 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Each value represents the planned weekly
9 2/28 74" machine hours created on the day shown in
10 3/5 51 112 left-hand column for the production weeks
11 3/14 129 113 114 shown along the row heading above
12 3/21 100 91 114 123
13 3/28 84 101 113 103 73
14 4/4 96 101 116 124 99 104
15 4/11 117 116 113 142 125 107 107
16 4/18 113 107 116 151 145 89 133 67
17 4/25 113 100 115 149 146 89 125 71 110
18 5/2 118 140 119 157 147 88 137 70 134 78
19 5/9 145 95 119 124 143 88 135 71 137 99 96
20 5/16 145 102 118 122 147 89 134 73 134 126 82 117
Figure 6: Weekly production hours planned
For example, at the start of production week 20 (the week of 5/16), there was an estimate
for each of the twelve future production weeks including week 20 (outlined row.) Also in
each of the previous eleven weeks there was an estimate of the production requirements
for production week 20 (outlined column.) Taking the average of upper-left to lower-
right diagonal across the entire set of twelve-week data yields average planned loading by
week in the future. For example, for the data set shown in Figure 6, the mean of the
values making up the top diagonal (74, 112, 114, 123, 73, 104, 107, 67, 110, 78, 96, 117)
yields the mean planned loading for week 12 of the schedule. The plot of the mean
planned loading for each of the twelve weeks scheduled in shown as Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Average of sensitizing machine weekly hours planned vs. number of weeks
into the future (2/96 - 9/96)
This can be compared to what might be considered a perfect schedule shown as Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Perfect schedule for sensitizing machine average weekly hours
number of weeks into the future
planned vs.
Here the schedule appears as a horizontal line between 120 and 125 machine hours
planned per week. This is perfect due to the lack of a schedule loading disparity between
the near-term and the long-term. In the perfect case, planners have made necessary and
sufficient accommodation for all sources of variability in their estimates for downtime,
event duration, and overtime. Knowing that their assessment of actual future
requirements is correct, the organization can make a low-cost allocation of resources
significantly ahead of when these resources will be needed. The thesis author placed the
line at the level of 123 hours since this is the mean of the hours planned for weeks one
through four in Figure 7, the mostly likely representation of the true hours spent on the
machine.
Returning to Figure 7, one sees a progression in weekly machine hours planned from
about 100 - 105 in week 12 to roughly 120 - 125 in week 1. So this would indicate that
over the period this data represents, each production week was increased on average
almost a full day of production as it moved across the 12 week horizon. To further
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substantiate the existence of the bow wave, the author calculated that approximately 75%
of the individual production weeks had negative slopes in hours/week when considered
from week 1 to week 12 of the schedule.
The increase in the average weekly hours planned from 11 to 12 weeks in the future
seems not to agree with what is actually occurring. If one looks at the actual data used to
generate the curve, removing a 188 hour 12th week projection for week 21 reduces the
planned hours estimate for week 12 from 107 to 103. This seems reasonable since there
are only 168 hours in the calendar week. Removing a 146 hour 12th week projection for
week 24 reduces the planned hours estimate for week 12 further from 103 to 101. It is
not uncommon for planners to designate excessive and unreasonable production in the far
end of the schedule if for no other reason than to tag the suspected need for sensitizing
events on particular products. The planners' intend to make the timing more reasonable as
the actual production date approaches. Although these unreasonable production plans
may be outside the lead time of the component suppliers, it is unacceptable in that it
makes resource and capacity allocation decisions suboptimal.
Further evidence of this practice of making an unreasonable schedule in the far weeks of
the 12 week sensitizing schedule is provided by Figure 9. Here the standard deviation of
planned machine hours is shown by number of weeks in the future. Each data point is the
standard deviation of the set of differences between the planned production of the future
week indicated and the production for that week as seen one week earlier.
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Figure 9: Standard deviation of weekly sensitizing hours scheduled by
week vs. number of weeks into the future
production
For example, from Figure 6, one sees that for production week 20, the difference between
the 12 weeks out and 11 weeks out schedule is 23 machine hours (74 - 51.) Taking the
standard deviation of set of 12 - 11 week differences for all production weeks yields a
value of 29, shown for week 11 in Figure 9.
Three characteristics of this plot are noteworthy.' 5 First, there is significant variation (as
defined in the previous paragraph) out beyond nine weeks in the future. This reinforces
the earlier suggestion that unreasonable production is planned frequently at the outer limit
of the 12 week planning horizon, and corrected in later weeks. Second, there is a local
maximum in the standard deviation at a point five weeks into the future, the outer limit of
the fixed zone. This indicates a spike in planning activity at that point as planners
attempt to resolve final scheduling problems before the schedule is fixed and they must
" Note that the author did not perform analysis on this data to determine which of these points were
statistically different.
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leave it as designed. (The schedule is fixed at this point so as to minimize the scheduling
disruption to emulsion and roll support suppliers. The scheduling and production lead
time of these suppliers is roughly five weeks, so changes to the sensitizing schedule
would cause changes in activities already set in motion. The fixed zone will be explained
in further detail in Chapter 3.2.) Third, the standard deviation continues to decrease as
one moves from the point five weeks out towards the production week one week in the
future. This indicates that even within the fixed zone, some changes are necessary.
However, there is recognition of the increase in cost as those changes are made closer and
closer to the actual production date as estimated by financial analysts within the CFM
Flow and shown in Figure 10.
Cost range ($)
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Figure 10: Cost Range ($) for schedule changes vs. Number of weeks into the future
These are costs within the CFM Flow and include such requirements as simple replanning
for changes at outer limit of the fixed zone to expediting new emulsion batches for
changes one to two weeks before the scheduled sensitizing date. The cost range is
uncertain for changes beyond five weeks in the future since this would impact suppliers
to emulsion and roll support. Reducing the schedule changes that impact raw material
suppliers is seen as a opportunity by the CFM Flow for reducing total supply chain cost.
Reducing the number of requirement changes affecting suppliers by enlarging the
sensitizing fixed zone will be discussed further in Chapter 3.2.
When initially confronted with the schedule loading disparity, the thesis author was
intrigued but uncertain as to the reason for deep concern. As one supply manager roughly
stated, the capacity and inventory planners know they have to do a lot of replanning and
additional loading of the near-term schedule, but they still manage to get the products
manufactured and meet the customer requirements. However, there are several concerns
with adopting this sense of security. The most critical of these is the degree to which
overtime on weekends was used to complete production scheduled for the five-day week.
As a planned production date approaches the real date, rework and incremental volume
are added to the schedule. Provided this extra production did not require more time than
was available with weekends and some lighter production weeks, products would be
assured of making it through the process at a reliable rate. One must remember that the
performance of the sensitizing machine is a distribution such that scheduled production is
completed some weeks and runs over in other weeks. Provided there is available
capacity, the probability of successfully completing any scheduled production run within
for instance one month from the initial production date is very high. As the available
capacity is reduced, the probability of successful completion within a particular
timeframe drops and the timeframe necessary to ensure successful completion of
scheduled production increases. A concern with this is that the sensitizing machine went
from five-day to seven-day schedule in late 1996 with the intention of adding more
volume to the schedule. If adequate weighting is not given to demonstrated performance
in assessing future production capabilities, then customer service could suffer due to the
loss of unscheduled weekend time for work overflow.
Another flaw with the confidence in demonstrated schedule completion at some
aggregated timeframe is the continued push for reduced cycle time and unit cost in
production. Reduced cycle time will require reducing the inventory that serves to
dampen the impact of unsuccessful sensitizing on the finishing operation. It will be less
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and less allowable to push some products back to provide machine time to rerun products
that suffered low yield. Cost reduction initiatives will continue to make "excess"
capacity unattractive, thus greatly eliminating discretionary machine time for rework.
The leaders of the CFM Flow realize that the planning and scheduling methods currently
employed are costly and have been taking steps to improve these methods. One step
taken has been simply to reduce the resources dedicated to scheduling sensitizing. The
CFM Flow enacted this change in 1996, independent of the work of this thesis, and found
there was no discernible impact to customer service, inventory, or unit cost. This result
emphasizes the point that many of the schedule changes being made had added no value.
Another step being taken is the addition of emulsion capacity which when in place will
reduce emulsion lead-time and the impact of emulsion supply variability on the
sensitizing schedule. Other steps are being taken to make sensitizing data more
accessible and manageable so that performance in capacity planning and product
scheduling can be tracked more easily and policy adjustments made as necessary.
Another very significant change undertaken by the CFM Flow reflects their
understanding of the desirability of a flat utilization schedule. In late 1996, the capacity
manager made significant adjustments to the sensitizing capacity plan to provide
undedicated capacity as necessary to meet wide roll requirements with less schedule
changes. The impact of these adjustments on schedule loading disparity will be shown in
Chapter 4.4.
3.2 Master production schedule stability
3.2.1 Measurement of master production schedule stability in the CFM Flow
It might not be evident why an overly optimistic expectation would lead to a schedule
loading disparity. A stable loading disparity (one that does not grow in size indefinitely)
requires there to be some undedicated capacity on the operation being scheduled. The
period studied by the author did in fact have this capacity in the form of initially-
unscheduled weekends. As initially-unscheduled weekends "approached" the present,
there was increasing likelihood that they would be needed for production in order to
maintain customer service. At the point where this capacity was consumed in producing
to meet new demand or remaking low-yield product, a "domino effect" of shuffling
production began. Prioritization had to be made across the multiple products sharing the
machine to determine the sequence of running that minimized cost and jeopardy of
stockout. When an unforeseen addition had to be made to the near-term schedule and
there was no remaining capacity, machine time had to be created by shifting out other
scheduled products. These could not be placed simply on the end of the schedule and
therefore, in many cases, needed to take the place of other scheduled products. When
capacity was highly utilized, these perturbations rippled across products and across time
to a point that the root causes of subsequent schedule changes were not easily traceable.
Although the continual rescheduling of schedules was considered by most involved to be
suboptimal, changing this practice lacked strong support. This seemed due primarily to
poor understanding of the relative impact of the various forms of variability and the costs
of rescheduling. It became evident to the author early in the bow wave study that a
"schedule disruption metric" would be very valuable in showing which schedule changes
were most disruptive and in verifying that process variability was a significant driver of
change.
The simplest disruption metric one might create is the pure number of master production
schedule (MPS) changes per week. Building on this, one might include the size of the
change in quantity of material or machine time affected, whether the product is being
shifted in or out in time, and how far in the future the change is occurring. In regards to
when the change is occurring, a factor which reflects changes within its cumulative lead
time (CLT) freeze zone (identical to fixed zone, defined earlier) different than changes
outside this freeze zone would aid in its accuracy. It would also be helpful to include a
measure of overall machine utilization associated with the change since this largely will
determine the magnitude of the resulting "domino effect." This need may not be that
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great though since one would expect a significant shift into a highly utilized week to
force other changes which would also be recorded. Although one can see easily the
directional impact of these various change characteristics, arriving at magnitudes which
reflect the overall disruption of the change is much more difficult.
The author searched literature on schedule disruption and found only one reference to a
quantitative measure of disruption. Sridharan, Berry, and Udayabhanu 16 developed a
measure for schedule instability in the interest of comparing three important decision
variables for MPS management in a rolling-horizon framework: the MPS freeze method,
the MPS freeze fraction, and the MPS planning horizon length.
Their equation takes into account the following three variables: the number of weeks into
the future that the change is occurring, the size of the change (how many units are being
added or subtracted), and a weighting factor "that applies decreasing weights to schedule
changes in periods of increasing distance in the future."
Although Sridharan, Berry, and Udayabhanu do not supply a derivation with their paper,
the thesis author will create a derivation adapted to the CFM Flow planning system, using
Figure 11 as an aid.
'6 Sridharan, V., Berry, W.L., & Udayabhanu, V. "Measuring master production schedule stability under
rolling planning horizons." Decision Sciences, 19, no. 1 (1988): 147-166.
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Figure 11: Depiction of multiple planning cycles in a rolling production schedule
The end result should be a relationship that quantifies system disruption created by
changes to the production schedule. One can define a production schedule change simply
as any alteration in quantity or timing in any period of a previously-established schedule.
The Flow uses a planning cycle frequency of once per week and a master production
schedule length N* = 12 weeks. The variable k will designate the specific planning cycle
in question, and Mk the first period of planning cycle k. The variable t will be defined as
the specific time period of the quantity change in question such that a quantity change x
weeks from the current week will be designated as occurring in time period t = x. Let Q
be the quantity of a specific product scheduled to be run in time period t and planning
cycle k. A weighting parameter a (0 < a < 1) will be used in combination with the
quantity t - Mk to weight quantity changes in the near future more heavily than quantity
changes in the distant future. Using the quantity t - Mk as an exponent on a such that it
will have a nonlinear effect. (A linear relationship would make schedule changes x/2
weeks in the future twice as disruptive as changes x weeks in the future. In reality,
_
changes become more disruptive and costly in an nonlinear fashion as they are made
nearer to the present, and the derived expression must reflect this.)
From Figure 11, one can see an example of comparing a change in quantity Q in period t
between planning cycle k and planning cycle (k - 1). The extent of this disruption will be
the product of the absolute value of the difference in quantity Q and the weight parameter
expressed as (1 - a)a, with the second ca raised to the exponent t - Mk.. In going from
planning cycle k to planning cycle (k - 1), the expression will sum these products across
all schedule changes (from t = Mk to Mk.l + N - 1.) As seen in Figure 11, these are the
summation limits because the expression only considers the time frame between the first
period of the current planning cycle Mk and the remaining part of the current schedule
that was part of the schedule in the previous planning cycle k, which is Mk.l + N - 1. The
expression then sums this summation across all planning cycles under consideration.
Dividing this value by S = the total number of orders across all planning allows for
normalization with respect to the total number of changes and total number of planning
cycles. This will yield a single disruption or instability value I which can then be used to
track the success of scheduling policy changes in reducing schedule instability.
Combining these as described yields Equation 1, provided by Sridharan, Berry, and
Udayabhanu. 17
Instability (1) =
Mkl +N-l
Sk-1 IQMI(-a)a-kl/S
Vk>l t= Mk
Equation 1: MPS Stability Measure
In this equation, the variables are defined once again as follows:
t = time period of schedule change
Qt= scheduled order quantity for period t during planning cycle k
Mk = beginning period of planning cycle k
N = planning-horizon length
a = weight parameter (0 < a < 1)
17 ibid., page 149.
S = total number of orders over all planning cycles
k = number of the planning cycle under consideration
As an example of the use of this expression, suppose a quantity Q = 100 of a particular
product is scheduled to run in time period t = 6 of planning cycle k = 4, with the first
period of the planning cycle Mk = 3. Suppose in the following planning cycle k = 5, one
finds the scheduled run quantity of this specific product has been reduced to Q = 50, still
in t = 6, with Mk = 4. Using a weight parameter a = 0.5, one finds that value of
instability I to be {l 50 - 1001 * (1 - 0.5) 0.5 (6-4)}/1 = 6.25. Considered in isolation, the
value is meaningless, but when compared across different time frames, it provides a
relative measure of change in disruption.
In the thesis author's opinion, this instability measure lacks completeness in that it does
not force a substantial enough difference in severity based on when the change occurs.
The weight parameter a does not create a step change in severity at the edge of the fixed
or freeze zone where a step change needs to be to agree with the component lead time
restrictions for the CFM Flow.
Given there were no other established instability measures available in published
literature, the thesis author proceeded with this measure. In order to have a baseline
sample of weekly schedule changes for the sensitizing machine, the author compared
weekly sensitizing schedules that listed scheduled production for every week of the 12
week planning horizon. He then recorded all changes in quantity and/or timing.
Unfortunately the author did not begin this comparison until production Week 37 of 1996
and only continued it until Week 44. Although recording the changes was relatively
simple, determining the apparent reasons for these changes was not. In order to
determine the causes for changes, the thesis author had to contact each wide roll planner
on a weekly basis to review all schedule changes within each planner's product
responsibility.
To associate a measure of disruption with specific causes, the author recorded the number
of changes by production week. A value of 0.5 was used for a since, in the thesis
author's opinion, it yields a weighting profile that most closely matches the cost
breakdown shown in Figure 10. The results of the analysis of the schedule changes for
the CFM Flow are shown in Figure 12. By visual inspection, there appears to be little if
any correlation between the number of changes and the schedule instability by production
week. Some changes are definitely more damaging than others based primarily on the
proximity of the affected week to the current production week.
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Figure 12: Number of schedule changes and stability measure vs. production week
To tie schedule disruption to the stated reason for each schedule change, the author
reduced the multitude of stated reasons for changes to thirteen. Figure 13 shows this set
of thirteen reasons as well as the results of the analysis. The five aborted sensitizing
events, which are defined as previous sensitizing events that resulted in essentially no
usable footage, were the most disruptive on a total and per change basis. Following this
reason, there appears to be some correlation between the number of changes and stability
measure by stated reason.
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Figure 13: Number of schedule changes and stability measure vs. stated 
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Another noteworthy part of the plot is the high number of changes driven 
by load
leveling. In most cases, this load leveling referred to the need to shift a particular
scheduled event out of an overloaded future week into another future week that 
had
ample undedicated processing time. Used properly, schedulers should load 
level only
when first making a schedule. Load leveling allows processes that can handle 
average
demand but not peak demand to continue to fulfill customer requirements. Provided 
that
adequate service can be provided to the customer and the costs associated with 
holding
extra inventory do not exceed the cost of adding additional capacity, load leveling 
is a
well-accepted technique. In the case of the sensitizing machine however, the need 
to
make frequent schedule changes in the interest of load leveling is driven by a
combination of poor planning and scheduling policies, very high utilization, 
and
significant variability from multiple sources. Load leveling in this situation 
exacerbates
the schedule loading disparity.
As stated earlier, there are obvious problems with the stability measure used 
to quantify
the impact of the reasons for the changes. However, this provides a good 
example of how
one might go about determining the major and minor drivers of disruption. This data
could be kept in a database to evaluate how specific improvements to the scheduling
system and reduction in the sources of variability are reducing schedule disruption.
3.2.2 Evaluation of the master production schedule freeze method
The freeze zone or frozen portion of a production schedule refers to that part (extending
from the current week to some future week) of the schedule which is considered fixed in
regard to quantity and timing of scheduled production runs. The production scheduled to
be run within this zone usually can be changed only by manufacturing management
approval. The CFM Flow historically has frozen a portion of the planning horizon by set
period rather than by order. The five-week fixed zone has been used for all products
running on the sensitizing machine without regard to the true time between orders.
Sridharan, Berry, and Udayabhanu showed through simulation that period-based freezing
produced far less stable schedules relative to order-based freezing. In their paper
"Measuring Master Production Schedule Stability Under Rolling Planning Horizons",
they compared stability of schedules by freeze method as well as by freeze proportion and
planning horizon length.
Using the researchers' simulation-based regression models for instability, the author
developed a comparison of period and order-based freeze methods using Kodak's 12
week planning horizon and both a two week and four week sensitizing frequency. The
results of this comparison are shown as Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Comparison of period and order-based freeze methods by resulting
schedule instability
The parameter for the sensitizing frequency enters the regression model by means of a
parameter for the number of sensitizing cycles in the 12 week planning horizon. Two to
four weeks represents the range of frequencies for a significant number of CFM Flow
products. The parameter F, proportion of horizon frozen, is defined as (number of
periods frozen)/(planning horizon length) for period-based freezing and as (number of
orders frozen)/(number of orders in the planning horizon) for order-based freezing.
Given a five-week frozen zone within a 12 week planning horizon, Kodak's freeze
proportion is about 0.4. The plot shows that over the entire range of freeze zone
proportions, order-based freezing is more stable than period-based freezing. From this
one can conclude that the CFM Flow could reduce schedule disruption by freezing
sensitizing orders rather than by freezing a specific time period. The author will address
this concept once again in the proposed planning policy later in the thesis.
3.2.3 Evaluation of buffering strategy for materials requirement planning system
disruption
In addition to looking at the freezing method, the author also chose to evaluate the wide
roll planners' strategy for justifying schedule changes and compare it to standard methods
established in literature. Chrwan-jyh Ho'8 studied several procedures for dampening
materials requirement planning (MRP) system nervousness: static dampening procedure,
automatic rescheduling procedure, and cost-based dampening procedure. MRP system
nervousness is a commonly-used scheduling term and refers to the disruptive changes to
component schedules created by changes in the master production schedule.
In this evaluation, for the static dampening procedure he used the dampening rule "which
ignores any reschedule-in message of only one week and any reschedule-out message of
less than two weeks." 9 A 'no rescheduling fence' is then established around the original
due date to differentiate the significant and insignificant rescheduling messages. Under
the automatic rescheduling procedure, all released open orders are rescheduled
automatically as the MRP system recommends with exception that no rescheduling is
allowed within the minimum lead time necessary for the component suppliers to provide
components. Lastly, the cost-based dampening procedure method looks at the cost trade-
offs of rescheduling and requires each rescheduling message be economically justified
before taking effect. Ho concluded from the experimental results that when the
parameters for the 'no rescheduling fence' are selected appropriately, the static
dampening procedure method results in the lowest MRP system nervousness. In
comparison to the other two methods, the automatic rescheduling procedure creates a
system with more disruptions and poorer performance.
n Ho, Chrwan-Jyh. "Evaluating the impact of operating environments on MRP system nervousness."
International Journal of Production Research, 27 no. 7 (1989): 1115-1135.
19 The term "reschedule-in" refers to a schedule change whereby a quantity of product to be run at a
specified time in the future will now be run earlier. The term "reschedule-out" is just the opposite in that a
quantity of product to be run at a specified time in the future will now be run earlier.
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The Kodak method of rescheduling seems to be a hybrid of the automatic rescheduling
procedure and the cost-based dampening procedure. Like the automatic rescheduling
procedure, the MRP system automatically reschedules outside the twelve week firm zone.
However, rescheduling within this firm zone is only accomplished by manual
intervention of the wide roll planners. Like the cost-based dampening procedure, an
economic disincentive to rescheduling within the fixed zone has been established so that
the instigators of rescheduling are aware of the economic penalties of changes in this
zone (see Figure 10.) It is obvious from the large number of one week changes that no
form of the static dampening procedure was utilized for scheduling the sensitizing
machine. Ho used a simple equation for quantifying MRP nervousness which consisted
of taking a summation of weighted reschedule-in notices and weighted reschedule-out
notices. A strong argument against this measure would be that one-week changes at the
far reaches of the planning horizon cause negligible disruption to the system and
therefore should be left to the desire of the wide roll planners concerned. Depending on
the discipline applied by the wide roll planners in rescheduling outside the 'minimum
lead time', the resulting nervousness could be similar to that created by the relatively-
poor performing automatic rescheduling procedure method. One can conclude from this
that sensitizing schedule disruption in the CFM Flow could probably be reduced by
imposing a static dampening procedure requirement on the magnitude of a desired
schedule timing change before it is allowed to occur.
3.3 Pool of Data on Actual Realized Footage to be Studied
3.3.1 Actual Realized Footage vs. Planned Footage
A robust production environment implies that the production process will make the
scheduled products reliably. In the case of a film sensitizing operation, wide roll
planners' plan and schedule specific lot sizes of wide roll to be sensitized. Ideally this
would equate with the amount of fit-for-use wide roll that is made available for the
downstream finishing operation. In the case of this operation however, the process is not
completely reliable with respect to common cause yield and uncommon cause yield.
Wide roll planners look for the "planned footage" (PF) to be generated, however the
"actual realized footage" (ARF) is some fraction of the planned footage. The ARF refers
primarily to that amount of wide roll that is not immediately scrapped as it comes off the
sensitizing machine. Although there is waste created with each production lot, the
material that is wound as wide roll must still pass a testing process to qualify as fit-for-
use. This testing process is described in detail in Chapter 4.3. The uncertainty about the
ARF and the time to test and pass the wide roll material creates significant disruption in
the sensitizing schedule.
Figure 15 shows the ARF vs. the PF for the sensitizing operation from 1/2/96 - 11/27/96.
The ARF scale should be read such that 100% ARF means the PF was the actual amount
wound off the sensitizing machine as sensitized wide roll. Excluding experimental
sensitizing runs, each individual product sensitizing event with PF < 500,000 ft over this
period is represented for a total of 606 data points. Seven events > 500,000 ft PF have
also been excluded from the graph to maximize visual resolution of those below 500,000
ft PF. The mean and standard deviation for the entire 613 point data set are 94.5% ARF
and 24.1% ARF respectively.
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Figure 15: Actual realized footage (%) vs. planned footage for all products
sensitized on machine (1/96 - 11/96)
Several interesting points can be made simply by observing the data configuration. First,
there is a significant drop-off in the occurrence of ARF > 120% as the PF exceeds 50,000
ft. Second, there appears to be a relatively tight band of ARF outcomes between 80% and
120% for all PF's. Third, there is a significant continued occurrence of ARF < 80%
(referred to as incident failures) at least up to a PF of 300,000 ft. The segmentation of
outcomes into these three apparently distinct populations as shown in Figure 16 helps
considerably in defining planning and scheduling policies for accommodating the
outcomes.
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Figure 16: Segmentation of ARF vs. PF data into distinct populations
The mean and standard deviation of the three populations individually are listed in
Figure 17. The total number of 603 points in the table are 10 less than the 613 due to the
7 points > 500,000 ft PF and 3 points > 50,000 ft PF which had % ARF > 120%.
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Figure 17: Statistical summary of three population data sets
Statistically, there is greater than 99% confidence that data population 1 and 2 are
different. Data population 3 is also different from 1 and 2 with better than 99%
confidence, however a strict statistical test does not make sense in comparing 3 to 1 and 2
since 3 is fundamentally a different type of distribution.
The most significant of the three populations in terms of schedule disruption is the
population # 3, events with PF > 50,000 ft, and % ARF 80%. Kodak refers to a
sensitizing yield result in this category as an incident failure (IF.) Yield loss of this size
is very difficult to accommodate, particularly when the sensitizing and component
suppliers equipment is highly utilized and when there is pressure to drive down safety
stocks of wide roll. This paper will address later the plan for minimizing the impact of
these incident failures on the schedule and safety stocks.
The population of ARF's >120% are very interesting but not significant in terms of the
impact on the chain. Since they occur on products with very short PF (< 50,000 ft), the
magnitude of the excess wide roll created is kept small. It is also noteworthy that excess
production causes one to postpone future production runs of the same product. A
schedule is disrupted much more significantly when production runs are moved up in
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time (sooner than previously planned) than when they are moved out in time (later than
previously planned.) Products with short PF's tend to sensitize infrequently compared to
products with long PF's. Consequently, a significant overrun (ARF % > 120%) or
shortfall (ARF % < 80%) on an event can be accommodated with a schedule shift for the
next event far out in the schedule or by keeping very minimal safety stock inventory.
There is also good understanding as to what causes these sometimes very significant
overruns. Uncommon cause yield is driven primarily by the number of unplanned stops
on the machine. To anticipate some probability of an unplanned stop and to ensure that a
significant amount of a product will be sensitized properly, product engineers size
emulsion batches to allow for some number of stops on the machine. If a stop occurs and
one stop was predicted, the ARF should fall roughly in line with the PF. If more stops
than predicted occur, the outcome would classify as an incident failure. If however,
fewer stops than predicted occur and the PF is small (- < 50,000 ft), then a significant
overrun will occur. The amount of extra component material kitted (withdrawn from
storage and collected in preparation for a sensitizing event) for the sensitizing event can
be 50% of the amount necessary to reach PF with no waste.
A very fascinating part of this plot is the asymmetrical nature of the ARF beyond PF of
50,000 ft. When, the PF exceeds 50,000 ft, there is adequate production time to feed
back information on sensitizing performance to the kitting20 operation such that
preparation of excess components can be avoided. However, if there is a high number of
machine stops due to machine problems, component problems or some other cause, extra
component material to make up the difference is probably not available. And since the
lead times for the components is on the order of weeks, remaking components to resupply
the sensitizing machine and continue the run is not an option. The operation could keep
extra emulsion in stock to guard against these incidents, but the cost would be
20 Kitting refers to the act of pulling from inventory and consolidating the components required for an
upcoming sensitizing event so they will be ready to run when the event start time is reached.
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tremendous due to the large number of different liquid ingredients, their limited shelf life
and the lack of excess emulsion-making capacity. Therefore, there is no production tool
to prevent shortfalls in output when there are production problems. Given the multitude
of emulsion components, the emulsion manufacturing lead time and its shelf life, this is
an economically prudent decision. Downstream inventory in sensitized wide roll and
finished product allow sensitizing to avoid additional component inventory.
3.3.2 Actual Realized Footage vs. Time
Figure 18 shows % ARF tracked over most of 1996. Once again, there is a relatively
tight band of outcomes between about 80% and 120% ARF. Focusing below this band
though, one can see that the number of production runs resulting in yields of 5 80% ARF
did not decrease as the year proceeded.
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Figure 18: Actual realized footage (%) vs. date for all products sensitized on
machine (1/96 - 11/96)
In fact it appears, as shown in Figure 19, that the number of significant yield shortfalls
appear to be increasing in frequency as the year goes on. Consequently, the problem with
incident failures was not isolated in time and the need to address it in the planning and
scheduling systems increased as the internship progressed.
-)
0)
r
.)
E
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
CU
Month in 1996
< 0.
Figure 19: Number of sensitizing events below 80% ARF vs. month in 1996
From the analysis in this chapter, one can conclude that there are three distinct
populations in terms of sensitizing yield. Since these populations are so different in
statistical attributes and the nature of their occurrence (frequency of occurrence and
relationship to runlength), it seems prudent that an analysis focused on each population
will provide further insight.
3.4 Statistical analysis of event yield data
3.4.1 Comparison of yield data to normal expectation
The analysis of the incident failures began with determining the frequency and severity of
their occurrence. Classical Deming training instructs us to determine the root cause when
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uncommon cause variation occurs and eliminate the root cause so that source of variation
will not occur again. This approach works well when the root cause is fairly specific and
when the frequency of occurrence is low. In the case of the sensitizing machine, yield
results that fall outside the limits of normal variation happen at relatively high frequency.
Classifying a set of outcomes occurring at high frequency outside the normal limits is not
entirely inconsistent since there are two distinct populations with distinctly different
causes. Further details of this will be provided in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2.
Another implicit industry standard also seems to be to tolerate uncommon cause variation
unless there are significant safety, environmental, or financial consequences from this
variation that could jeopardize the health of the firm. Processes would include machine
design, instrumentation and controls, and even planning and scheduling systems. The
mindset is that one cannot and should not anticipate and accommodate economically all
possible disturbances to the process and inputs, so one should focus on eliminating these
causes if they occur. Most projects would never be profitable if the designers took all
steps necessary to eliminate the probability of any uncommon cause disturbances,
regardless of cost. This is not to say that one should avoid evaluating the tradeoff
between probability and risk, and the cost to minimize both of these.
Significant yield shortfalls for a sensitizing event are usually associated with unplanned
stops of the machine. However, the reasons for the unplanned stops are complicated and
it has not yet been shown that they can be eliminated by root cause analysis. In addition,
new products are added continually to the product mix which forces the CFM Flow back
to the bottom of the learning curve. Although an increased awareness of design for
manufacturability allowed several products introduced in 1995 and 1996 to have
significantly shorter rampups in production efficiency, the painful learning in the early
phases of a new product's life will most likely not go away entirely. Consequently, the
CFM Flow has accepted that a relatively high frequency of these incident failures is the
norm until major steps are made in sensitizing capability.
In order to provide an appreciation for the separation between common and uncommon
cause yield variation, the author compared actual yield data from February through July
1996 with the normal expectation of yield using the actual mean and standard deviation.
The author focused only on sensitizing events with PF > 50,000 ft since incident failures
in this range cannot be protected against economically with schedule shifting and safety
stock inventories. In developing the histogram, the ARF of each individual event on a
specific product constitutes a data point. As Figure 20 shows, there is very poor
agreement between histogram for the actual point-to-point data and the normal
distribution given the mean and standard deviation of the same data. Using a chi-square
test on the two distributions, one is better than 99.5% confident that the two distributions
are different.21
21 The use of a chi-square test requires a reasonable assumption that the distributions under consideration
are normal. One usually uses a chi-square test to compare the distributions of two different sets of data. In
this case, the thesis author is comparing the data set with itself, or rather the normal expectation of itself. It
is essentially a check for normality.
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Figure 20: Frequency distribution of actual realized footage (%) for sensitizing
events with planned footage exceeding 50,000 ft (2/96 - 7/96): comparison of actual
with normal expectation
One can now begin removing points at the tails of the distribution of actual 
data and
repeatedly testing for normality. In doing this, one must remove the 11 
data points 5
64% ARF and the one data point of 164% ARF to gets the histogram of 
normal
expectation shown in Figure 21. (Note that the 12 data points have been removed from
the histogram calculation but are still shown graphically.)
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Figure 21: Frequency distribution of actual realized footage (%) for sensitizing
events with planned footage exceeding 50,000 ft (2/96 - 7/96): comparison of actual
with normality expectation excluding incident failures up to ARF 68%
By inspection, one can see a dramatic improvement in the agreement between the 
normal
curve and the true data. In regards to goodness of fit, the chi-square statistic for the
reduced data set is 14.04. For the number of degrees of freedom allowed, the critical 
chi-
square value at 0.005 percentile is 28.0. Therefore since 14.04 < 28.0, one can see 
that
the fit is extremely good. From this one can conclude that the hypothesis that the
underlying yield population is normal cannot be rejected. One can also conclude that, at
the least, yield results below 64% ARF (within data population 3 from Figure 17) are not
part of the probably normal population.
3.4.2 Evaluation of variability vs. planned footage
Observing the data in Figure 15 of Chapter 3.31, one may be tempted to think 
that there is
a strong correlation between variability in % ARF and PF beyond the simple break 
at
50,000 PF. Knowledge such as this would provide support for increasing sensitizing
event lot sizes in the interest of achieving lower variability in outcome. The author 
tested
the strength of a correlation across a multitude of PF segments in the range of 80% 5
ARF 5 120% and found only one segmentation that confidently supported decreasing
%ARF with increasing PF. A chi-square test revealed that there is 94% confidence in a
difference in the distribution of outcomes for events with PF < 200 KLF (thousand linear
feet) vs. that distribution of outcomes for events with 200 KLF < PF < 350 KLF. No
other more detailed segmentation revealed a difference in variability of any significance.
This result does seem to be supported by a visual inspection of the ± two standard
deviation band two sigma band in Figure 22.
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Figure 22: Two standard deviations around the mean of %ARF vs. PF based on
80% - 120% ARF on sensitizing machine (1/96 - 9/96)
One can conclude from this analysis that this single break in two populations may be
helpful in adjusting some lot sizes but was not of the significance anticipated by some in
the CFM Flow.
I
4. Source Specific Analysis & Proposed Policies
4.1 Uncommon cause process variability- incident failures
To mitigate the schedule disruption associated with the uncommon cause incident
failures, the author and several members of the CFM Flow developed and implemented a
plan. This section analyzes incident failures and discusses design and implementation
results of the Headroom for Incident Failure Plan. This terminology will be explained
shortly.
4.1.1 Analysis of uncommon cause variation
At this point it is important to discuss the reasons why the thesis author selected an
incident failure ceiling of 80% ARF. The most compelling reason is that the limit of
positive yield results (> 100% ARF) is 120% ARF. Having shown that the underlying
common cause variation is normal, it seems reasonable to use the expectation of
symmetry and place the incident failure limit at 80% ARF. Another reason for this
choice of 80% ARF is the statistical data for data population 2 given in Figure 17. For
this data population set, two standard deviations below the actual mean is 80.6% ARF.
The use of two standard deviations agreed with the confidence level that the CFM Flow
managers felt was appropriate.
In examining the phenomena of incident failures, the author tabulated and graphed all
IF's from mid-February through October 1996 by number.22 The data revealed 37 IF's
spread over 42 operating weeks, a time period which seems sufficient to represent the
long-term frequency of occurrence. Figure 23 shows that 50% of the weeks have no IF's,
n In analyzing the incident failure phenomena, the thesis author did not look for correlation with specific
operators, crews, days of the week, or other potential drivers. Research into the actual incident failures
revealed there were a multitude of different causes, ranging from physical problems with component
materials, sensitizing equipment malfunctions, and poor photographic performance of the sensitized
product. Therefore, with only 53 incident failures to analyze and given the time required to gather and
maintain data against which to test correlations, the thesis author concluded that the probability of a
correlation did not justify the time to investigate potential correlations of this nature.
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and that the remaining weeks are split roughly evenly between one and two IF's per
week. Of the two remaining weeks, one incurred three IF's and one incurred five IF's.
Although one might presume this distribution to be Poisson in nature, the data shows a
poor fit with a Poisson distribution.
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Figure 23: Probability distribution of incident failures (5 80% actual realized
footage) on events exceeding 50,000 planned linear feet on the sensitizing machine
by number per week (based on data from 1/96 - 10/96)
In regards to goodness of fit, the chi-square statistic for the data set distribution is 16.97.
For four degrees of freedom allowed, the critical chi-square value at 0.995 percentile is
14.9. Therefore since 16.97 > 14.9, one can conclude with high confidence that the fit
with a Poisson distribution is poor. To test the impact of the single week with five IF's,
the author removed this week and recalculated the goodness of fit. The chi-square
statistic for the new data set is 6.32. The new critical chi-square value at 0.9 percentile is
7.78 and at 0.75 percentile is 5.39. So the probability that the IF frequency is Poisson
increased considerably, but not sufficient to say with 90% confidence that it is Poisson.
Fundamental to a Poisson distribution is independence of occurrences. It would seem
that the poor fit is due to the lack of independence between IF's. When an IF occurs,
there is an increased probability that another will occur due to the sensitizing machine
being the fundamental driver.
4.1.2 Description of the Headroom for Incident Failure plan
The fundamental problem with incident failures is that since they are uncommon cause in
nature, they can not be predicted statistically on a product level. Each product that is
sensitized on the machine may experience a single incident failure every year or less
frequently. Therefore, to adequately protect with inventory the supply to finishing
against this occurrence, the chain would need to stock the equivalent of an entire event or
more in every product, in addition to the inventory for other sources of variability. This
is the reason that safety stocking for insurance against incident failure would be
prohibitively expensive. In the case of incident failures, the CFM Flow has a number of
options for continuing to meet customer requirements until a new sensitizing event on
that product can occur. These options would include accelerating the release rate of any
product still in quality testing and using the common cause safety stock inventory to
maintain a supply to finishing.
The key leverage points are that the incident failures are fairly predictable in aggregate
and that the products in question are being sensitized on a single machine. These support
the concept that stockout insurance in the form of undedicated capacity (headroom) on
the sensitizing machine is preferable to inventory.2 Undedicated capacity or headroom is
defined as that amount of sensitizing capacity reserved in the schedule that will be
utilized, although the nature of its use is not known at the time it is placed in the
schedule. Essentially, the Headroom for Incident Failure Plan involves leaving room in
3 This premise was not modeled by the thesis author for validation, although a model would be useful in
this respect Those individuals in the CFM Flow connected with the problems and this concept were
comfortable moving forward with a plan that utilized this concept, given the probability they might be
wrong.
the future schedule just outside the minimum lead time of the component suppliers,
adequate in size to allow resensitizing of the majority of products which might suffer an
incident failure. This headroom would be placed at the end of the second week after the
current production week, well within the standard fixed zone. Given this quick remake
time, inventory is replenished much sooner than otherwise and disruption to other
previously-scheduled products is minimized.
4.1.2.1 Size of Headroom Window
A fundamental initial question about the headroom for incident failure plan was the
optimal size of the future headroom window. A window of insufficient size would not
provide adequate time on the sensitizing machine to make a significant proportion of
products. A window of excessive size would create problems in utilization if an IF did
not occur. An initial rough estimate by the author yielded a size of approximately nine
hours per week. However it was obvious from the simplicity of the calculation method
and the comparison to planner's qualitative recognition of the majority of event durations
that this timeslot would be inadequate. Therefore the author developed a cumulative
distribution of the sensitizing event size for all products on the sensitizing machine, based
on runrates in hours per square meter, sensitizing events per year, and anticipated
volumes by product for 1997.24 Figure 24 shows the graphical results of this calculation.
24 The reader is reminded that although no model was used to substantiate this optimal window size, a
model would serve well in this purpose.
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Figure 24: Cumulative percentage of all sensitizing events sized in hours based on
1997 volume projections for sensitizing machine
To determine this distribution, the thesis author used the calculation method shown in
Figure 25.
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Figure 25: Flowchart for calculation method used to derive cumulative distribution
of event sizes in hours
This method is particularly useful since it considers the probability that a given product
running on the sensitizing machine will be of a particular event size. If incident failures
are essentially random with respect to the product being sensitized, this is exactly the type
of relationship one would want to use in specifying a headroom size.
It is interesting that the original size of nine hours would have been able to accommodate
no more than 20% of all sensitizing events occurring on the machine in 1997. From this
analysis, it seemed reasonable to use a window size of 18 hours since that would provide
room for almost 70% of the events to occur. Also, given there is elasticity in the schedule
two weeks out, using an additional five hours would not be unreasonable and would raise
the coverage to about 80%.
4.1.2.2 Mechanics ofplan
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In evaluating the feasibility of an 18 hour window, the sensitizing machine capacity
planner expressed concern over the schedule disruption that would result from trying to
dissolve or fill the entire window in the case of no incident failures in a week. To balance
the need for a window of adequate size against the need to minimize schedule disruption,
a clever solution was devised. The 18 hour window two weeks out would actually be two
9 hour windows as depicted in Figure 26. A portion of undedicated capacity also would
be placed in the emulsion schedule one week out (in Week B) from the current
production week to allow emulsion to be remade in time to supply the new sensitizing
event. Due to roll supports high utilization and shared customer base, a window of
undedicated capacity may not be available. Roll support typically makes any individual
type of support once every two - three weeks, so a good portion of the support will
already be made. (In those cases where it was not, the wide roll planners will need to find
the earliest time for a sensitizing event when roll support will be available.) Normally
emulsion is being made three to four weeks ahead of when it is required in sensitizing.
As Figure 26 shows, emulsion being made in Week A normally will be used in
sensitizing in Week D.
Reschedule of coating incident failure
.00 .. f-
Sensitizing
Schedule /
Current Next
Week/ Week/ Week Week D Week E
Week A Week B
Em ulsion/Support
Make Schedule 
/
Current
Week
Make for Make for
Coating Coating 0 000
Week D Week E
Figure 26: Use of headroom when incident failure occurs
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In the event that an incident failure did occur in the current week (Week A), the entire 
18
hour window would stay in the sensitizing schedule and be used for remake 
in Week C of
the product that failed in Week A. Although this might be considered 
standard batch
scheduling procedure, using this approach in a formalized fashion was 
novel to the CFM
Flow.
In the case that a sensitizing incident failure did not occur in a given week, 
nine hours
would be dissolved and nine hours would be shifted out a week. As Figure 
27 shows,
dissolving the nine hours would result in the entire schedule moving forward 
by that
amount. Shifting the other nine hours would result in Week D shifting 
forward the entire
18 hours.
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Figure 27: Headroom action when no incident failure occurs
To put this plan into place, the sensitizing machine capacity manager placed the 18 hour
window in the last week (week 12) of the 12 week master production schedule for mid-
September. The 18 hour headroom window transitioned through the 12 week production
schedule until the second week of December when this first window was available two
weeks out. Sources inside the planning organization have confirmed that at least from
December through February, incident failures were occurring at roughly one per week,
about as predicted. In each case, the headroom for incident failure was used for remaking
the low yield product, resulting in reduced disruption to other scheduled products.
4.2 Common cause process varfability
4.2.1 Analysis of common cause process variability
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Prior to 1995, safety stock levels for individual sensitized wide roll products reflected
little historical process variability. Training by a Kodak statistics expert throughout that
year provided wide roll planners with some tools for setting safety stocks in a statistically
accurate way. The original intention was that demand variability would be considered in
the form of forecast error and supply variability in the form of lead-time uncertainty only.
However, the variable yield nature of the sensitizing operation and the magnitude of this
uncertainty led the CFM Flow to use the forecast error calculations for process variability
as well.
Classical safety stocking calculations use a true standard deviation based on an
assumption of normal variation. To simplify the calculation without losing too much
information, the planners use the mean absolute deviation (MAD %) calculation for
variability instead of the true standard deviation. This MAD % is simply a arithmetic
average of actual footage/planned footage in percent for each individual sensitizing event.
(Using a set of special MAD safety factors for customer service level minimizes the
difference from the true standard deviation result.) The general formula used is the
following:
Safety stock for = MAD % * 5 Weeks Lead-time * Safety factor for
desired process variability customer service level
(forward weeks
of supply)
The point should be made here that this is not a safety stock for process variability in the
traditional sense. Sensitizing event outcomes are analogous to supply variability wherein
an event is like a receipt of material from a supplier. If the quantity of material received
from a supplier is less than that specified by the recipient, this represents supply
variability. The recipient operation must carry enough safety stock in produced goods to
insure against stockout of parts to the next operation until the next scheduled shipment
arrives. Since the CFM Flow uses a fixed zone as described earlier, it cannot respond to
common cause process variation by placing a new sensitizing event in these first five
weeks of the schedule. All the process uncertainty is a result of the sensitizing event
itself. Therefore, the MAD calculation determines how much material in forward weeks
of supply must be carried to cover against the process variability that acts like supply
variability.
As an example of how this calculation works, consider the following table of fictitious
sensitizing event outcomes. The author has arranged the once-monthly yield outcomes in
order that the true mean centers on 100% planned footage. The insufficiency of the data
set will be ignored for the purposes of the example.
Figure 28: Example table for MAD safety stock calculation
The mean absolute deviation for this product that sensitizes once a month is 7%. For a
desired service level of 98%, the Table of Safety Factors distributed to the planners gives
a MAD safety factor value of 2.56. The above equation then yields:
Safety stock for
process variability
= 7% * 5 weeks * 2.56 = 0.9 forward weeks of
sensitized wide roll supply
This would be the inventory level necessary to ensure that 98% of the time, adequate
wide roll would be available to finishing in regards to sensitizing process variability.
Therefore, with a set of yield results from previous events, a planner can calculate what
the safety stock for a particular product should be to prevent stockout due to process
variability at some confidence level.
However, this formula makes several assumptions that should be questioned. The first
concern that might be raised is in regard to the appropriateness of using forward weeks of
supply as the safety stock unit. In his 1993 LFM Masters thesis 25, Bill Hetzel describes
how the use of FWS can lead to the "springboard effect" (a common industry term,) an
ongoing situation wherein noise in demand and forecast is amplified as the information is
transmitted up the chain. His statement that "forecast changes cause safety stock
changes" assumes that a forecast change is closely followed by actual production to
adjust the safety stock. In the case of two production areas in series, the upstream wide
roll production operation produces to meet its own safety stock requirements in forward
weeks of supply as well as the safety stock requirements for the downstream operation.
If one closely examines the planning system used by the wide roll planners, one sees that
noise in forecast or demand does not trigger changes in actual production, but rather
changes in the production schedule. Using essentially a reorder point system, the wide
roll planners look out to see what the anticipated demand is beyond the fixed zone. Noise
in the forecast will change the anticipated inventory on hand at some point in the future
and therefore adjustments in production timing and quantity are made to the schedule.
However, all of these changes fall outside the fixed zone, since this target inventory is
composed of cycle stock and safety stock for process and demand variability.
A second assumption is that the five weeks lead-time is appropriate for all products. This
five weeks flows from the five week fixed zone, the scheduled future period over which
25 Hetzel, William. B. LFM Masters Thesis: Cycle Time Reduction and Strategic Inventory Placement
Across a Multistage Process. MIT Sloan School of Management, MIT Department of Chemical
Engineering, (1993), pp. 69 - 74.
schedule changes are to be avoided without significant reason. However, this five weeks
implicitly assumes that each product sensitizes once every five weeks even though the
true sensitizing frequency may be more or less than this. To work around this
assumption, there must be some representation of the true average sensitizing frequency
for each product. The thesis will explore this in more detail later in the section on
recommended policies.
Another assumption to reconsider is the number of past events used for calculating
inherent variability. Figure 29 is a copy of a typical supply safety stock page for two
different products from line of business I. The top section of data is for the product
designated code 1 (also referred to as product 1) and the bottom section of data is for the
product designated code 2 (also referred to as product 2.)
LOB CODE
XXX
GIS
GIS Coe j LGIS
GIS
GIS
GIS
GIS
GIS,
GIST
GIS
GIS
GIS
GIS
XXX
MEAN ABSOLUTE DE
SUPPLY SAFETY ST
SUPPLY SAFETY ST
ORD
WK
ORD
CTD CTD QTY ORD
DATE DATE PLAN P/D
PLAN ACT K2'S K2'S
21.8
10.9
21.8
10.9
17.3
31.8
14.5
31.8
26.0
23.0
VIATION
OCK=5 WEEKS LEADTIME+98%
OCK-5 WEEKS LEADTIME+98%
XXX
SIS
OIS
GIS
GIS618
GIS
GIS
SIS
GIS
GIS
GIS
GIS
GIsGIS
3.6
9.2
3.6
12.8
2.9
5.7
ORD
OTY
ACT
K2'S
23.4
14.0
22.2
11.2
14.2
32.9
13.8
32.5
25.6
24.4
PERF
ACT/
PLAN
ABS
SUPP
VAR
LATE CODE/REASON
===U=== ======= =======:=U====U===P===W
107.34%
128.44%
101.83%
102.75%
82.08%
103.46%
95.17%
102.20%
98.46%
106.09%
CUSTOMER SERVICE
CUSTOMER SERVICE
3.4
8.6
3.7
11.5
2.0
2.8
94.44%
93.48%
102.783.
89.84%
68.97%
49.12%
7.34%
28.44%
1.63
2.75%
17.92%
3.46%
4.83%
2.20%
1.54%
6.09%
7.64%
0.98 WEEKS
6.85 DAYS
5.56%
6.52%
2.786
10.16%
31.03%
50.88%
MEAN ABSOLUTE
SUPPLY SAFETY
SUPPLY SAFETY
DEVIATION
STOCK=5 WEEKS
STOCK-5 WEEKS
LEADTIME+98% CUSTOMER SERVICE
LEADTIME+98% CUSTOMER SERVICE
Figure 29: Supply safety stock calculations for Graphics codes
Code 1 uses ten data points representing ten sensitizing events over the previous 57
weeks, and code 2 uses six data points over the same historical period. Most statistical
texts claim that a minimum of 20 points are necessary to draw any reasonably confident
conclusions about a distribution.
17.82%
2.28 WEEKS
15.97 DAYS
Codz
The working of the resulting safety stock level in forward weeks supply is as follows.
The wide roll planner targets new production to keep each product's inventory level
above the minimum inventory level. This minimum is defined as the overall safety stock
level for all forms of uncertainty and determines how far the wide roll level should be
allowed to fall before a new event is ordered. If process (defined as supply in Figure 29)
variability is the only source of variability for code 1, then the wide roll planner schedules
a new sensitizing event at the future point when the projected inventory drops to 6.85
days of supply to finishing.
As Figure 30 shows, using only a few samples yields little information about the
protection needed. With only ten data points for a product with a yield standard deviation
of 10%, one must use a yield range of roughly 6% - 14% yield to be 95% confident that
one has captured the true standard deviation. In the case of code 2, the methodology
yields a safety stock level of roughly 16 forward days supply.
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Figure 30: Confidence intervals +/- (95%) for two standard deviations of a normally
distributed population vs. number of samples
Another important consideration not figured into the safety stock calculations is the
sensitizing bias by line of business (see Figure 31.) The MAD calculation method
assumes that the true mean of yield is 100% of the targeted footage by calculating the
difference of each outcome from the targeted footage. In many cases for CFM flow
products however, the true mean has proven to be more or less than the targeted footage.
The correct calculation method determines the mean % yield footage from past events
and then calculates the difference of each individual outcome from this true mean.
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Figure 31: Sensitizing bias and 95% confidence intervals by line of business for all
products and all events with target footage > 50 KLF and actual realized footage
between 80% and 120% on sensitizing machine (1/96 - 11/96)
One further problem with the procedure is that it provides no rules for eliminating special
cause outcomes. The methodology for dealing with incident failures varied from planner
to planner but consisted mostly of individual judgment. Each planner was faced with
tradeoffs such as including or excluding potential outliers and the impact of this on an
already anemic sample size.
In the case of code 2 shown on the bottom half of the wide roll planner safety stock
calculation sheet appearing as Figure 29, the understanding of true mean yield and
sensitizing bias is critical to arriving at appropriate safety stocks. Ignoring for the
moment the fact that there are too few points with which to work, one can see that two of
the six event yields are less than 80% of target footage, classifying them as incident
failures. It is not sufficient to use the true mean alone, one must also consider the nature
of the points going into that true mean. If one includes these two "extra 20%" points in
the calculation, the true mean calculates to 83%. This would classify the 69% yield event
in week 12 as part of common cause variation and would almost flag the 103% yield
event in week 45 as part of uncommon cause variation. Outside of the calculations,
neither one of these two conclusions seems reasonable. However, if one also removes the
69% and the 49% points from the true mean calculation, the new true mean becomes 95%
and the result from week 45 is only 7.7% above the mean. Granted more data points
would dampen the effect of outliers on the true mean, but this example illustrates that the
calculation is slightly iterative with respect to what points should be included and
excluded. This is an important step in making an effective policy since the policy for
common cause variation is not intended to provide protection against uncommon cause
variation or incident failures.
Figure 29 also shows the lack of differentiation in safety stock calculation based on event
size. Code 1 sensitizing event lengths are mostly above 50,000 ft PF whereas code 2
sensitizing event lengths are below 50,000 ft PF without exception. This thesis discussed
earlier that small runners (defined as having PF < 50,000 ft) would have a safety stock
policy of either holding an event worth of inventory or shifting future event timing.
Another important point is that these small runners tend to be run as part of a family of
related products. Sequentially, they tend to be sensitized last in the family. For a given
quantity of common component material for the family, this "place in line" makes the
small runners yield outcome dependent on the sensitizing performance of all other
products sensitized in that family. If another product experiences some waste, it will
most likely be sensitized to the planned footage, stealing support and emulsion from
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those family members being sensitized afterwards. Consequently, one could question the
sense in trying to characterize the distribution of outcomes on a small runner, the yield of
which is strongly dependent on other products.
Given the thesis author's concern about data sufficiency and the inclusion of incident
failures, the author sought to determine the validity of product-by-product variability and
safety stock calculations. To improve the size of the data set, the author aggregated all
product yield outcomes into their respective lines of business. The thesis author chose
this level of aggregation since the most fundamental differences in products are
associated with the business classification the product. Products within a line of business
tend to have very similar technical complexity and therefore process variability. The
author developed % ARF distributions for each line of business and compared these
distributions to the distribution of the entire set of yield outcomes for all products
sensitized on the machine. The results of this comparison are shown as Figure 32.
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Figure 32: Confidence that distribution of actual realized footage by line of business
is different than that of all events sensitized (with line of business sensitizing biases
and events < 50,000 ft removed) for all products running on the sensitizing machine
(1/96 - 11/96)
As the reader can see, only one line of business (H) had a distribution of outcomes which
one can say with high confidence (2 90%) is different than the yield distribution at large.
All other lines of business had varying degrees of confidence in their uniqueness, but all
were below what statisticians consider to be a sound confidence level.
These results were very surprising to the managers in the CFM Flow in that they didn't
agree with their intuition about the varying degrees of complexity and resulting yield
uncertainty associated with products in different lines of business. There are several
possible reasons for the lack of fit between intuition and statistical results. First of all,
this analysis only looked at the incident failure-free common cause variation of each line
of business. People in the CFM Flow tend to associate products with their incident
failure history since these painful outcomes leave a strong impression. Without rigorous
analysis, it is difficult to consider and draw conclusions about historical differences by
line of business in common cause variability only. (In support of the analysis results, the
managers did agree that products in the H line of typically had very good runs compared
to the rest of the product mix.)
A second cause of the data's surprise factor may relate to the difference in sensitizing
performance perception and the actual statistical recording for performance for products
that sensitize in families. As mentioned earlier, a product that has long sensitizing runs
and sensitizes in a family may have a poor yield but still reach target footage since it can
steal material from products sensitizing later in the family sequence. Although this
would hurt the yield of the smaller runners, the impact of a poor performance on the large
runner that sensitizes frequently leaves a stronger impression than a poor performance of
a smaller runner, the footage from which may not even be required for some time. The
data may record a good outcome in terms of reaching target footage for the large runner,
and an IF for the small runner (which will be excluded from calculation.) Consequently,
the common cause yield data set will make the products look as if they ran better than
they actually did. Even so, as long as the CFM Flow continues the practice of shorting
later runners in the family to support the early runners, this should be viewed as the
process variability for safety stocking purposes.
There may be other reasons the data is surprising but the key point is that outside of
products in the H line of business, the wide roll planners are only justified in setting
safety stocks on a sensitizing machine basis across all products based on all outcomes.
They should continue to revisit this analysis over time since different products/lines of
business have different learning curves and they may find that others will drop out of the
aggregate distribution as being unique. The author will provide details later in the thesis
of the steps to take for calculating and updating these safety stock levels.
4.2.2 Proposal for handling common cause process variability
The first step in accommodating the true common cause process variability is to remove
any and all sensitizing biases. Removing sensitizing bias properly may require some
iteration between calculation of the true mean yield and the determination of incident
failures. Some judgment must be used since incident failures will reduce the calculated
true mean such that some incident failures may not fall outside the 20% range. (For a
further description, one can refer to the discussion of calculating standard deviation for
product 4 following Figure 29.)
To calculate the sensitizing bias, one should use sensitizing yield data for the past 12
months and confirm the existence of a bias for each product by sensitizing family (for
those products that sensitize as part of a family) and by individual product for those
products that sensitize alone. Then, one should make an adjustment in expected footage
from a given quantity of emulsion as specified by the calculated bias such that 100% PF
is the true mean yield. Until such adjustments to the information systems are made,
remove the bias from calculation by calculating the standard deviation from the
calculated mean of the set of actual outcomes for sensitizing variability rather than from
the target 100% PF.
The standard deviation of sensitizing process yield (sp) should be recalculated every six
months. The first step is to remove all incident failures from the data set so these
outcomes are not included in the calculation of common cause process variation. One
should do this by searching the last 12 months of sensitizing yield data for incident
failures (incident failures being defined as events having PF > 50 KLF and %ARF < 80%
PF) and remove these from each product's set yield data.
Following this, one needs to check for uniqueness of yield distribution between each line
of business and the set of all products sensitizing on the machine (as of 11/96, H is the
only unique line of business at 90% confidence.) To do this, one should calculate a chi-
square value between each line of business yield distribution and the entire product set
yield distribution to test for goodness of fit. If the confidence in uniqueness exceeds 90%,
one should consider that line of business distribution unique. Otherwise, one should
consider it part of the sensitizing population. Then using the appropriate data set, one
should calculate the standard deviation (sp) as follows: sp = ( (sum(true mean yield -
%ARF for each event)2 )/(n-1))0 5 where n = number of events in the data set. The
parameter (Sp) can be kept in units of percent or multiplied by average event size to get
KLF (thousand linear feet.) This measure of common cause process variability sp can be
combined with other forms of variability (described in Chapter 4.4) to determine optimal
safety stock levels and to enable a freeze policy that will reduce schedule disruption
passed to component suppliers.
4.3 Wide roll testing variation
This section of the thesis does the following:
1. describes the existing process for evaluating wide roll,
2. presents the author's statistical findings for products across all lines of
business,
3. discusses some alternatives for how test release variability might be captured,
4. recommends one of these approaches that can be incorporated easily into an
overall variability policy described later.
4.3.1 Description of wide roll physical testing process and analysis of variation
4.3.1.1 General description of wide roll physical testing process
A major source of variability associated with Commercial film manufacturing at Kodak is
the dispositioning of wide roll material when initial testing of the material signals that
making an acceptability determination will be difficult. This discussion and analysis of
variation only consider physical testing since this is the major driver of high variability in
test time. Film is also subject to other types of testing, the release times for which tends
to be less variable. The sensitizing yield data analyzed to this point is a record of the
break between product that is initially-nonconforming (know right away at the sensitizing
machine it is unacceptable) and product of initially-uncertain conformity (need testing to
confirm that it is acceptable.) The majority of the initially-uncertain conformity product
is reviewed and released within a few days after the event (outside of the aging period
required for some products.) However, that product which is not released during this
initial period due to suspect quality enters a detailed testing and review phase, the nature
of which creates problems for planning systems.
Figure 33 provides an overview of the testing process for most Commercial sensitized
wide roll. The inherent complexity of manufacturing these products becomes apparent in
the types of defects encountered and the sophistication of the tools used to detect and
evaluate these defects. Although scanners have been employed successfully in finding
problems that might go otherwise undetected, their output requires painstaking review by
sensitizing technicians and engineers. When empirical algorithms for discerning the
nature of these defects fail to provide enough information for proper disposition,
technical personnel request additional samples from the affected areas of the wound rolls.
Time is required for mechanical removal of these samples from the rolls and for the
follow-up analysis of these samples. The large number and variable duration of the steps
that must occur to reach a final disposition decision for these rolls creates uncertainty in
the timing and quantity of fit-for-use wide roll released from sensitizing.
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Figure 33: Sensitized wide roll physical testing tree
A fundamental problem with the current sensitized wide roll evaluation scheme is that
staff personnel are releasing production product in a relatively slow fashion. This time
lag creates significant problems with scheduling new production since the quality of
material produced is not determined within a specific time frame. The disconnect in time
and urgency between the production process and the staff evaluators prevents a tight
feedback loop between the operation and inspection. Rapid inspection of output is
necessary for processes with significant variability seeking to run at high utilization.
There are weekly meetings between the planning staff and engineering staff for each line
of business focused in large part on discussing the probable outcome of sensitized rolls
held for extended evaluation. The planning systems don't do a good job of retaining
information about rolls on extended hold. Past occurrences have included rolls on hold
that were not labeled as such in the inventory system, and rolls that simply are no longer
uct shown through
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relied on to meet demand. Although the planners have requested upgrades to the
information systems, resource availability to perform this is low and the project is not
considered to be a high priority.
4.3.1.2 Analysis of wide roll testing variation
Although the quantity of rolls requiring intense testing scrutiny is considered by many to
be small, the effects of this testing appear significant. Figure 34 shows the distribution of
release times for 8,864 rolls that could be associated with a line of business out of a total
9,025 rolls sensitized between 1/2/96 and 9/27/96.
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Figure 34: Distribution of days from sensitizing to release for all rolls sensitized on
the machine (1/2/96 - 9/27/96)
All aging/transformation periods have been removed where applicable since these do not
relate to the variability in release time, which is the focus of this test release analysis.
The data shows that in aggregate, 80% of the rolls are released in 16 days or less and 90%
in 32 days or less.
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The wide roll release data available to the thesis author for analysis did not show what
rolls that went into testing were eventually discarded due to poor quality, nor did it show
what fraction of each complete roll that went into testing came out. (Sometimes, sections
of a roll have quality problems. Finishing will cut out these sections and use the rest of
the roll used as conforming product.) The thesis author was told by several individuals
that the percentage of tested rolls that are eventually discarded is very small. The data
used to generate Figure 34 show that more than 98% of the entering rolls did make it out
of testing. Given this information, it seems reasonable to assume that all rolls are
eventually released and that policies that use this assumption will be very close to
policies that consider the material that is eventually discarded.
If one looks at the release distributions by line of business, one sees a picture consistent
with the known complexity of the products being analyzed for release. Although it is a
somewhat difficult plot to read, Figure 35 shows the distribution of release time
aggregated by line of business.
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Figure 35: Cumulative percentage of all rolls released vs. number of days from
sensitizing to release by line of business (1/2/96 - 9/27/96)
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Except for C, D, and E, every line of business releases 70% of its rolls in 10 days or less.
The release distribution of E seems to be the most interesting of those shown in that it is
the only LOB that does not rise dramatically in cumulative % released inside of 10 days.
Instead it follows a linear path in cumulative % released up to 80% at 40 days. This
would indicate that few E rolls escape a rather torturous testing regime and there is a
much broader range of quality considerations for E products that tend to spread out the
data. Therefore, one can conclude that products in lines of business C, D, and E have test
release times that are considerably more variable than the release times of the products in
the remaining lines of business.
Figure 36 shows the same data at selected release percentages in tabular form. These
values could be incorporated into a policy for capturing wide roll testing variability, the
forms of which will be discussed shortly.
Line of .
Business 25% 50% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 98%
A 1 1 b 11 12 12 30 60
B0 1 21 0 95 95 119 204
C 3 6 16 24 26 33 46 58
D 2 10 23 40 48 50 68 94
E 14 23 37 42 54 70 85 100
F 4 7 13 13 13 31 49 53
G 4 6 12 13 14 21 26 43
H 2 4 6 7 12 23 30 36
I 1 1 5 7 9 13 23 50
J,K 1 2 3 3 3 8 14 18
Figure 36: Number of days from sensitizing to release by cumulative percentage of
all rolls released for each line of business (1/2/96 - 9/27/96)
Using a graphical format for two categories of release percentage, 75% and 90% released,
one has a better view of the distribution of release times by line of business (see Figure
37.)
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Figure 37: Number of days from coating to release for 75% and 90% rolls release by
line of business
One result shown in Figure 37 that is misleading is the number of days to release 90%
for line of business B. The sensitizing machine being analyzed is not used very often to
produce B products; there are only 63 total rolls of B produced over this time period and
only ten B rolls took longer than 95 days to be released. This is in fact a relatively easy
product to produce to specification, so one should consider these facts when devising a
policy to address test release time variability.
As with sensitizing process yield variability, test release time variability also presents the
level of aggregation for calculation issue. For several reasons, it makes sense to consider
test release variability at the line of business level. First of all, the test release staff are
assigned to wide roll evaluation by line of business and develop expertise with the
products for which they have accountability. Second, the wide roll release data in its
current form is relatively difficult to manage and manipulate.- For this reason, using the
line of business level reduces the data manipulation workload considerably. Lastly, due
to the wide variability in test release, the size of the data set at the product level may be
inadequate to properly characterize this variability. The author uses product 3 of line of
business G and product 4 of line of business D for analyzing test variability and deriving
policies because these data sets are easy to manipulate.
Upon studying the release rate of wide roll on a product-by-product basis, one quickly
realizes that there is a fairly repeatable distribution of sensitizing to release times. This
pattern consists of a well-formed and characterizable hump shortly after the sensitizing
event and then a poorly formed, non-characterizable pattern of longer release times.
Figure 38 provides a classic representation of the test release process.
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Figure 38: Distribution of days from sensitizing to release for product 3 on the
sensitizing machine (2/96 - 9/96)
For product 3, the reader can see that better than 80% of the rolls are released in 20 days
or less. The peak at 25 days comes from a single event that had over 40 rolls released 22
days after sensitizing. In some sense this set of outcomes is driven by the notion that
things tend to go right similarly but they go wrong in different ways.
The release pattern of Product 4 displays a similar pattern. Figure 39 shows the wide roll
release distribution for all sensitizing events on product 4 from 1/96 to 10/96. If one
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ignores the large release at day 55, each roll of which came from a single event, there
appears to be a well-defined distribution up to about 40 days release time and a fairly
random distribution beyond 40 days. The release rate is longest at the beginning because
a significant number of rolls have such good initial quality that they can avoid the product
staff evaluation altogether. (Note that the initial aging period has not been removed from
this data. When attempting to capture test variability on this and other products requiring
aging, this initial transformation time should be subtracted before calculating a measure
of variability.)
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Figure 39: Distribution of days from sensitizing to release for product 4 on the
sensitizing machine (1/96 - 10/96)
Obviously, the rolls of product 4 that were shown through initial evaluation to be
conforming were released immediately and those rolls requiring additional testing were
released some time after that.
One can conclude from this analysis that a substantial percentage of wide roll entering
testing is released almost immediately and that the remaining rolls are released across a
broad range of time. One can also conclude that there is considerable variability in
release times by line of business. Since one has little statistical confidence in the actual
release time of rolls taking a long time to be released, it seems unreasonable and costly to
base new event scheduling on these rolls with long release time.
4.3.2 Alternative policies for dealing with test release variability
Because there is no way to predict the pattern of release times following the initial release
phase, it seems sensible that any protection plan using statistics for test variability should
focus on the initial release period only. The multitude of testing procedures, transfer
steps, and sampling steps that can occur to product that is shown through evaluation to
have uncertain conformity makes the second mode difficult if not impossible to
characterize. Event to event, prediction about the probable release timing and quantity is
unreliable at best. Therefore, one should focus on that material which is shown through
evaluation to be conforming, since this is reliable and characterizable.
For rolls that aren't released as part of the initial release phase, some other simple policy
should be applied. This policy could be to simply assume these rolls are bad or non-
conforming and to plan future events accordingly. When a sizable number of these held
rolls over multiple events do come available, they could be released as a lot, perhaps
large enough to allow the elimination of an entire future event. In any case, the practice
of making sensitizing production schedule timing dependent on a few held rolls appears
suboptimal.
The testing release of sensitized wide roll is a significant problem for planning and
scheduling systems. The yield off the sensitizing machine discussed earlier consists of a
single data point per event. However the uncertainty in quantity and timing of wide roll
testing release causes each event to have its own distribution. This added complexity
must be taken into account setting a protection policy.
Previous attempts by wide roll planners to establish safety stock for test variability
actually dealt with the mean time to release. Wide roll planners would calculate the
average of all release times by product and then add this amount to safety stock. The
problem with this method is that there is no accounting for variability in the release times.
Taking the mean of the entire distribution, including the compressed short-term mode and
the random Ion-term mode, may cause the protective mechanism (in this case safety
stock) to be excessive in some instances and inadequate in others.
4.3.2.1 Characterization of test release distribution as Poisson
Suppose that one wishes to incorporate test variability into a stockout protection policy.
Keeping in mind the nature of the distributions observed in Figure 38 and Figure 39 (well
defined initial peak in release time and a random release time thereafter,) one would
choose to base a protection (safety stock or safety lead time) quantity on the well-formed
part of the distribution. If one could associate a known distribution with the release data,
then one could incorporate this variability easily into a safety stock policy. Based on
visual inspection of Figure 38 and Figure 39, the distribution of release times appears best
characterized as Poisson.
A problem with characterizing these distributions as Poisson is that rolls of a particular
product are sensitized and released as separate occurrences. Consequently, a roll in one
event will tend to have more in common with other rolls in the same event than with rolls
in other events. As such, if one roll in an event is found to be conforming, there is strong
probability that the following roll will also be conforming. However, this non-
memoryless nature of wide roll quality is dampened as the size of the data set grows and
a Poisson model for release time is more applicable.
Depending on the amount of data available one can either judge qualitatively where one
believes the right tail of the Poisson curve ends or one might perform a chi-square on the
data and find the point where one can first say confidently that it is no longer Poisson.
Judging qualitatively the release time distribution for product 4 in Figure 39, it appears
that the distribution ceases to be poisson-like at approximately 35 - 40 days after
sensitizing, or when about 70% of the rolls from the event have been released. Since one
cannot speak confidently about release times after 40 days, one would schedule a new
sensitizing event based on when this 70% would be depleted by finishing. One could
then include the a (standard deviation) for the distribution in a combined safety stocking
policy that accounts for all major sources of variability, discussed later. This would
provide high confidence that given the event-to-event variability around this 70%,
sensitizing would not stock out finishing due to test variability. Rolls released outside
this distribution would be accumulated across multiple events and classified in the
tracking system as released when a significant number were became available.
4.3.2.2 Comparison of release rate to finishing rate
Another approach to capturing test variability is to compare the test release rate to the
finishing consumption rate. Figure 40 and Figure 41 depict such a comparison for the
average test release rate and finishing rate across multiple events of product 3 and product
4 respectively.
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Figure 40: Cumulative distribution of days from sensitizing to release and average
finishing rate for product 3 on the sensitizing machine (1/96 - 10/96)
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Figure 41: Cumulative distribution of days from sensitizing to release and average
finishing rate for 5089 on the sensitizing machine (1/96 - 10/96)
What is immediately obvious is that neither product on average is released nearly in time
to satisfy finishing demand completely. This situation of apparently inadequate product
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for finishing does not lead to frequent stockouts due to several reasons. One, when
finishing has consumed all the rolls from eventN+, there are likely rolls that have released
from eventN that were not available to finish after eventN and before eventN+l. Second,
when the wide roll inventory is critically low, wide roll test release can be expedited. The
time spent focusing on the release process though takes away from other engineering staff
functions such as improving existing film products and developing new ones. Lastly,
there is safety stock in sensitized wide roll that helps to bridge the lag between the time of
the sensitizing event and the time of release.
For product 3, finishing demand on average exceeds product released after 17 days, and
for product 4, after 33 days. It is very interesting that these crossover points coincide
almost perfectly with the outer limit of the first release distributions depicted earlier in
Figure 38 and Figure 39. In fact, the average sensitizing frequency over 12 events of
product 3 between 3/96 and 9/96 is one event every 17.2 days. It would appear that the
wide roll planners know implicitly the reliability of the test release process and schedule
new events accordingly. Contrary to this observation is the average sensitizing frequency
of one event every 11 days taken over 20 events of product 4 between 1/86 - 8/96. This
high frequency of sensitizing is most likely due to the fact that this product is part of a
sensitizing family which sensitizes on average every other week. In this case, the CFM
Flow can afford to make smaller and more frequent lots of product 4 with little additional
setup cost.
From a statistical standpoint, one can look at the distribution of the difference between
the number of rolls released in each event (NR) and the rolls consumed by finishing (NF)
at the time of each sensitizing event. Such a view is shown in generic form as Figure 42,
where those curves denoted as Wide roll testing release rate are the actual event-by-
event distributions.
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Figure 42: Basis for determination of wide roil test variability for safety stocking
Wide roll planners set the sensitizing schedule outside the fixed zone such that there is
always five weeks of time over which any particular event date is set. Every product with
significant demand has a sensitizing frequency that is relatively constant over time.
Given these two facts, it is highly unlikely that the actual event-to-event sensitizing
frequency will be affected appreciably by the difference between what has been released
from the last event and the amount of material consumed by finishing since that event.
This difference is the quantity NR - Np. Given the likely independence of sensitizing
frequency on NR - NF, one can use the distribution of N - NF to generate an appropriate
measure of test variation.
It is important to understand that for a particular product, a single data point in this
distribution will be the value Np - NF recorded at the start of one sensitizing event for
that particular product. The collection of (NR - NF) for all events forms a distribution that
is most likely normal. The variance of the distribution of (NR - NF) could serve as a
measure of test variability in a combined safety stocking policy. In the case of product 3
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from Figure 40, one would use the time (17 days) to finish 83% of the target sensitizing
footage as the time between sensitizing events. Based on the historical data set (NR -
N)product 3, one would calculate a test release standard deviation (st) which would then be
used in a combined safety stocking and safety lead time policy described in the following
chapter.
4.4 Method for combining variability to set safety stock and freeze future
orders
The overriding purpose of this policy is to incorporate the three principle forms of
variability (process, test, and demand) into safety stock calculations and to allow for
freezing by future orders instead of by a fixed period.26 In the CFM Flow's current
method of freezing by period, events are implicitly frozen based on whether or not they
are scheduled to run within the current + four week period. However, the number of
events frozen depends on the sensitizing frequency and when in the sensitizing cycle one
is seeking to make the determination. For instance, if a product sensitizes every three
weeks, the number of events frozen over a five week fixed zone will depend on the point
in the sensitizing cycle as shown in Figure 43.
26One must consider here the complicating factor that some products coat as part of coating families. The
coat dates of some smaller running products are driven primarily by the schedule of the larger runner(s) in
the same family. In most cases though, these smaller runners have average event sizes of < 50 KLF, so
they are not covered by this scheduling policy.
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Figure 43: Inventory vs. time showing number of events frozen by point in the
sensitizing cycle
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The proposed method of freezing targets a certain number of future events to freeze rather
than a time period to freeze. (The thesis showed in Chapter 3.2 that order-based freezing
offers more stability to the schedule than period-based freezing.) Certain managers in the
CFM Flow expressed the desire to freeze larger parts of the sensitizing schedule to reduce
the schedule disruption transmitted upstream to raw materials suppliers. This reduced
disruption to raw material suppliers would allow these suppliers to reduce their inventory
safety stock levels for demand variability, saving money for Eastman Kodak. The
optimal number of sensitizing events to freeze for this purpose is outside the scope of this
thesis. However, in an upcoming example, the author chooses to freeze two events since
it is slightly more "constrictive than a typical product sensitizing every three weeks with
a five week fixed zone. The term constrictive here refers to the fact that for this product,
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only one event is frozen one-third of the time in period-based freezing whereas two
events are always frozen in order-based freezing.
When freezing multiple events with independent outcomes, there is a real probability of
consuming all safety stock due to a series of negative event outcomes or high demand.
To ensure this stockout does not happen, one must "restore" safety stock consumed due
to poor yielding events and high demand. Since the sensitizing events are considered to
be fixed in size, one must adjust timing of future events to "restore" this spent safety
stock.
Because demand variability is considered to be outside the scope of this thesis, the author
chose to represent demand variability with a single measure in units of ft/week. In
reality, demand variability consists of both monthly forecast error as well as weekly
finishing variability. Due to the lead times of the liquid and support components for
sensitizing and the high utilization of sensitizing, planners must rely on the monthly
forecast to schedule future sensitizing events. They may then "tweak" the event timing as
the true weekly finishing demand "rolls in." The author is uncertain as to the most
appropriate representation of all sources of demand variability, but for this exercise one
quantity will be used to represent it. 27
With regards to capturing test variability the author makes several assumptions:
1. Average time between sensitizing events is equivalent to the number of days
from the occurrence of an event to when the number of rolls released from that
event is equivalent to the number of rolls consumed by finishing since the start
27 To account for both forecast variability and finishing variability, one might divide the monthly forecast
error by 30/7 (number of weeks in average month) to arrive at forecast variability by week. Then one
could combine this measure and the weekly finishing variability into the Tad expression as the following:
T d2  (2d-forecast + 2d-finishing ad-for-finad-forecastad-finishing)
Here, r is defined as the timing of the n + I event, where n = number of events that are frozen. The author
is uncertain as to the degree of independence between forecast variability and finishing variability and the
coefficient (ad.-forefin very well may be 0. Further understanding and investigation into the causes of
finishing variability would be necessary to determine the extent of correlation.
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of the event. One can define this length of time as the following: tavg(EventN+1
- EventN) = t(E(NR - NF) = 0), This combined policy will only consider the
variability in (NR - NF), defined earlier.
2. Over a sufficient timeframe, the number of rolls entering testing - number of
rolls exiting testing. This allows for rolls held from one event to be replaced
by rolls released from previous events.
3. All rolls that enter testing eventually make it out, i.e. no rolls are discarded.
For purposes of a combined protection policy, this is a good assumption. The
current inventory position I(0) over time will capture this difference and future
event timing will be adjusted to correct this difference over time.
4. Test time is independent of common cause process outcome. There is a
temptation to believe that products which experience problems and have low
yield might take more time to test. Although it has not been statistically
verified, the experience of individuals in the Flow indicates this is little
correlation between the two variables. This seems reasonable since there here
are a number of sources of uncertainty impacting test time which are unrelated
to the outcome of the most recent event (such as competition for sensitizing
staff's attention.)
Deriving expressions for both safety stocks and event timing for a product P requires
defining the following variables for product P:
t = average time between events in weeks
n = number of events that are frozen and that have not occurred
Qtarget = target footage for an event in feet (assume constant)
r = time for event n + 1 in weeks (decision variable)
sp = standard deviation of process variation in ft/event
p = mean demand by finishing in ft/week
Sd = standard deviation of demand variation in ft/period-week
st= standard deviation of test release variation as defined by s(NR.-NF)
in feet/event
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It is apparent that the inventory at some time in the future just prior to the n + 1 event is
the sum of the current inventory and the footage produced by the next n events minus the
demand between now and the n + 1 event. In equation form,
I(C') = I(0) + nQ - D(0, T)
where implies these parameters are non-deterministic.
In setting the timing -T of the n + 1 event, one desires the probability that the inventory
just prior to this n + 1 event exceeds 0 to be some high number, such as 0.98 or,
Pr (I(') > 0) = 0.98
The expected value of the inventory just prior to the n + 1 event can be expressed as
E(I(r')) = I(0) + nQtget - p
where t is defined as the mean demand per week. The variance and standard deviation
of I(t') can be expressed respectively as
Var(I(r)) = nsp2 + nst2 + TSd2 and
s(I(f')) = (nsp2 + nst2 + TSd2 ).5
To have 98% confidence that a stockout will not occur, one wish to set r such that
E(I(r)) = 2s(I('))
or simply the safety stock level. Using the earlier definition of E(I('r)) and s(I(T')) the
following equation results:
I(0) + nQ - t T= 2(nsp2 + nSt2 + TSd2 0.5 Equation 2
For the stockout protection policy that is being recommended, the yield outcome of the
most recent sensitizing event is included in the safety stock calculation. The concept of
number of events frozen can be confusing due to the nature of the process variation
considered here. As was discussed earlier in the thesis, all process uncertainty appears
immediately in the outcome of the sensitizing event itself. However, test release
uncertainty (as it has been defined in this thesis) for one event does not appear until the
time of the next event. In other words, one is exposed to test release uncertainty from the
most recent event to the next event and therefore must protect over this period.
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This policy allows for adjustment in timing of event n + 1 until immediately after the
most recent event has occurred. Consequently, freezing n events that have not occurred
has the following implications for safety stock and future event timing:
* safety stock must protect against process variability over n events, and test
release variability over n + 1 events
* the timing of the next event following the n frozen events will be used to
accommodate the actual process outcome from the most recent event only.
Therefore, since the evaluation of t will be made immediately after the most recent event,
equation 2 becomes the following:
I(0) + Qmost recent event + nQtarget - ~r = 2(nsp2 + (n + 1)st2 + TSd2 0.5 Equation 3
where I(0) remains the inventory level just prior to the most recent event.
As an example of setting safety stocks for combined variability and of timing future
events to avoid stockout (see Figure 44 for depiction of this policy), suppose one enacts a
policy of having one event (event 2) frozen beyond the most recent event (event 1) and
one bases the decision for timing of the event (event 3) following the frozen event on the
yield outcome of the most recent event.
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Figure 44: Event freeze and timing for stockout protection policy with one frozen
event
This policy would need to protect against process variability in the single future frozen
event (event 2), and against test release variability for the most recent event (NR - NF
recorded at the time of event 2) and the single frozen event (NR - NF recorded at the time
of event 3.) As defined, this would imply n = 1, the number of future events frozen that
have not occurred using an observer position immediately following the most recent
event.
To continue with the example, suppose a sensitized product P of concern has the
following parameter values:
n = 1 frozen event that has not occurred (as just defined)
Qtarget = 100 ft
sp = 10 ft/event
t = 5 weeks between sensitizing events(average)
p = 20 ft/week
Sd = 5 ft/period-week
st= 5 ft/event
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To keep the example simple (see Figure 45 for depiction of the example), the author has
chosen to use linear feet of material expressed as "feet" as the units of the parameters.
(Yield fraction and demand variability as a fraction of event size work as well.) The
expected safety stock levels for both sources of variability are calculated using the right
side of Equation 3 with t = nt (where n = 2, one event that just occurred and one event
frozen beyond this):
Safety stock (98%) = 2(1(10)2 + (1 + 1)(5)2 + 10(5)2) 0.5 = 40 ft
Now let us suppose in Event 1 there was a yield outcome of 85% ARF or 85 ft and that
the actual inventory position just prior to Event 1 was 26 ft. One can use Equation 3 to
determine the proper placement r of Event 3, the event following the frozen event as
follows:
26 + 1(85) + 1(100) -20c = 2(1(10) 2 + (1 + 1)(5) 2 + r(5)2). 5
which solves by quadratic formula to the real solution of T = 8.6 weeks. These policy
actions are depicted in Figure 45.
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In this figure, current time is taken as t = 0. Based on the combination of the inventory
position I(0) of 26 just prior to Event 1 and Event l's outcome of 85 ft, inventory
increases to 111 at time t = 0. Equation 3 directs us to shift Event 3 inward 1.4 weeks so
that it occurs 3.6 weeks after Event 2. (If the inventory position I(0) had been 45 (design
safety stock level) and Event 1 had reached the target footage of 100 ft, then Event 3
would remain scheduled to occur 5 weeks after Event 2.) One sees that in terms of
replenishing safety stock, process outcome is taken into account by the Qvent 1 value and
demand outcome and test delay by the I(0), the actual inventory level just prior to Event
1.
Since this policy allows the CFM Flow to freeze future orders (while protecting the
customer against stockout), there will be a reduction in schedule disruption transmitted to
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raw material suppliers. The lower raw material inventories that can result from this
reduced disruption has the potential for significant savings.
4.5 Impact of general headroom changes on bow wave
Prior to and during the author's tenure at the host company site, the CFM Flow Division
was considering changes in the headroom allocated to the sensitizing schedule. Towards
the end of the internship, three significant scheduling-related changes took place:
* the sensitizing machine went from a five-day to a seven-day a week operation
in November 1996 (a result of increased demand for sensitized goods, not a
result of the internship findings)
* the capacity manager put significant additional "headroom" into all future
sensitizing weeks in November 1996 to allow for common cause process and
demand variability (partly a result of the internship findings)
* the CFM Flow implemented the Headroom for Incident Failure Plan in week
12 of the September 1996 such that it was first available for use in early
December 1996 (a direct result of the internship findings)
It is difficult to specify the particular impact of each of these policy changes on the
accuracy of future sensitizing workload. However to get an idea as to how effectively the
CFM Flow was allotting future capacity, the author gathered scheduling data after the end
of the internship and built the plot of weekly machine hours planned vs. number of weeks
in the future. As the reader can revisit, this was the basis for displaying the schedule
loading disparity in Chapter 3.1.2.
Figure 46 compares the schedule loading disparity for the period May 1996 - September
1996 to the schedule loading disparity for the period October 1996 - March 1997. One
can see that there is a dramatic difference in the two lines.
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Figure 46: Average of sensitizing machine weekly machine hours planned vs.
number of weeks into the future (5/96 - 9/96 & 10/96 - 3/97)
The weekly hours planned for the earlier period follows the schedule loading disparity
pattern with near-term loading exceeding long-term loading. The plan for 11 and 12
weeks in the future was for a load of 100 - 105 hours; and as time rolled forward, the
planned load increased to 117 - 118 hours for 1 - 2 weeks inthe future. However, for the
later period, the same phenomena did not occur. The plan for weeks 11 and 12 carries
118 - 128 hours and for weeks 1 and 2 in the future carry 119 - 126 hours. It would
appear that the combination of new scheduling policies is doing a much better job of
aligning anticipated machine load with actual machine load. From this viewpoint, the
bow wave has disappeared.
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5. Recommendations for Future Work
Although the author would like this work to be the comprehensive solution for
Commercial Film's variability problems, this simply will not be the case. The issue of
variability in the Flow is a complex one, made difficult by the large number of varied
products, the multiple sources of variability, as well as the difficulty of the film
sensitizing process itself.
The author can recommend several areas for follow-up work in the future:
* determine the parameter values for the combined variability policy an
implement the new safety stocking policy
* determine the optimal number of future sensitizing events to freeze as
impacted by
* evaluate the component supplier financial opportunities created by reducing
schedule disruption through sensitizing order-freezing
* streamline the actual process of updating calculations of variability
* find opportunities for transforming the wide-roll evaluation and testing
process from a primarily staff function to a primarily production function
Pursuing improvement in these and related areas should allow the to provide excellent
protection to its customers at low cost.
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6. Conclusions
From the study of the Commercial Film Flow of Eastman Kodak Company, the thesis
author has concluded the following:
* segmenting the three forms of process variability (common cause process,
uncommon cause process, and test release) and developing individual
planning, scheduling, and inventory policies that are customized to each
variability form has resulted in significant financial gains to the CFM Flow
* incident failures (uncommon cause low yield) are unpredictable at an item
level, but their frequency of occurrence is fairly predictable in aggregate
* for products that sensitize in events > 50 KLF, the CFM Flow should
protect against incident failures with undedicated machine capacity,
not with wide roll safety stock
* for products that sensitize in events < 50 KLF, the CFM Flow should
protect against incident failures with wide roll safety stock, not with
undedicated machine capacity
* a policy for allocating undedicated capacity in the future schedule to
allow for remake of products that have suffered incident failures has
proven to be significant in reducing the need for safety stock inventory
* a significant percentage of wide roll entering testing is released very soon after
in predictable fashion. However, a number of rolls take much longer and their
eventual release time is highly unpredictable. To protect against test release
variability, the CFM Flow should keep safety stock inventory based on the
variability in the distribution of the difference between the number of rolls
released in each event and the rolls consumed by finishing at the time of each
sensitizing event.
* common cause process variability for the wide roll sensitizing is a normal
distribution. Safety stock should be used to protect against this form of
uncertainty.
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a safety stock and future event timing policy that allows freezing of future
sensitizing events so as to reduce the schedule disruption transmitted to raw
material suppliers. Implementation of this policy could result in significant
savings across the supply chain
Many times, all that is needed to change an organizational culture is education. The
willingness of the individuals in the CFM Flow to try the policies recommended in this
thesis and the success these policies have had are a direct result of the following:
* the proper characterization of the phenomena under study by the thesis author
and the uncovering of its root causes
* the gathering, analysis, and presentation of relevant data that substantiate the
reasons for the policies.
Production planning and scheduling systems that do not recognize and accommodate
process variability with an understanding of that variability will incur significant schedule
disruption and require substantial inventories to provide adequate customer service. This
thesis has shown that, through statistical analysis of the individual sources of this process
variability, one can improve the planning, scheduling, and inventory policies to reduce
the impact of the variability and realize significant cost savings.
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7. Appendix
7.1 Step-by-step comprehensive policy
The following is intended to serve a summary guide for how the author recommends the
individual sources of variation be characterized and combined into a policy that protects
against stockout at reasonable cost.
Steps for Capturing Variability
I. Remove all sensitizing biases (both process bias and calculation size).
(Removing sensitizing bias properly may require some iteration between
calculation of the true mean yield and the determination of incident failures.
Some judgment must be used since incident failures will reduce to calculated true
mean such that the incident failure may not be outside the 20% range. One can
refer to the discussion of calculating standard deviation for product 3 following
Figure 29 for a further description.)
A. Using sensitizing yield data for the past 12 months, confirm the existence
of sensitizing bias for each product by sensitizing family if one exists,
otherwise calculate it by product.
B. Make an adjustment in expected footage from a given quantity of
emulsion as specified by the bias such that 100% PF is the true mean
yield.
C. Until such adjustments are made, calculate the standard deviation from the
calculated mean of the set of actual outcomes for sensitizing variability
rather than from the target 100% PF.
II. Recalculate the standard deviation of sensitizing common cause process variation
(Sp) every six months
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A. Search the last 12 months of sensitizing yield data for incident failures
(incident failures being defined as events having PF > 50 KLF and %ARF
< 80% PF.) Remove these from each product's set yield data.
B. Check for uniqueness of yield distribution between each line of business
and the set of all products sensitizing on the machine (as of 11/96, H is the
only unique line of business at 90% confidence)
I. line of business- Combine the remaining sensitizing yield
outcomes by line of business
2. Sensitizing machine- Combine the remaining sensitizing yield
outcomes for all products sensitized on the machine.
3. Calculate a chi-square value between each line of business yield
distribution and the entire product set yield distribution to test for
goodness of fit
4. If the confidence in uniqueness exceeds 90%, consider that line of
business distribution unique. Otherwise, consider it part of the
sensitizing population.
C. Using the appropriate data set, calculate the standard deviation (sp) as
follows: sp = ( (sum(true mean yield - %ARF for each event)2)/(n-1))0.5
where n = number of events in the data set. The parameter (sp) can be
kept in units of percent or multiplied by average event size to get units of
KLF (thousand linear feet.)
III. Recalculate the standard deviation of test release process (s) every six months
A. For each line of business, calculate the data set (NR - NF), the distribution
of the difference between the number of rolls released in each event (NR)
and the rolls consumed by finishing (NF) at the time of the each sensitizing
event.
B. Calculate the standard deviation st = ( (sum[mean(NR - NF) - (NR - NF)
for each event}]2)/(n-1)) 0 5 where n = number of events in the data set.
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The parameter (sO can be kept in units of KLF (thousand linear feet) or
divided by average event size to get units of percent.
IV. Recalculate the standard deviation of demand (Sd) at an appropriate frequency
A. Use a method for calculation that considers the variable nature of both the
monthly forecast and weekly finishing rate.
B. Keep sd in units of % or KLF (thousand linear feet), but be consistent with
the other two sources of variability.
V. Utilize the method for combining variability and freezing orders discussed in
Chapter 4.4 to set safety stock levels and determining scheduling of future
sensitizing events.
A. For each product determine the desired number of events to freeze (n)
B. Based on the known measures of variability, use actual sensitizing
outcomes, and inventory positions to determine timing of the event
immediately following the n frozen events.
VI. Continue using the Headroom for Incident Failure Plan described in Chapter
4.1.2.2.
119
7.2 List of Acronyms and Explanations
BOM- bill of material
bow wave- same as schedule loading disparity
CFM Flow- Kodak Commercial Film Manufacturing Flow Division
common cause variation- day-to-day variation
Freeze, frozen, or fixed zone- the portion of the production schedule, usually in the near
term, that is considered fixed and unchangeable without significant reason for a change.
Code Names for film LOB's:
headroom- undedicated capacity in the future sensitizing schedule
incident failure- a sensitizing event yield outcome < 80% of target footage
MPS- master production schedule, the schedule for finished goods from which the
schedule for component suppliers is determined
MRP- material requirements planning
MRP II- manufacturing resources planning
nervousness- schedule disruption transmitted to component suppliers from changes to
the master production schedule for finished goods
safety stock- inventory carried to protect against stockout due to variation in supply,
demand, and process variation
schedule loading disparity- near-term higher loading, long-term lower loading in the
future sensitizing production schedule
shortfall- a sensitizing event outcome of < 100% target footage
UMC- unit manufacturing cost
uncommon cause variation- significant variation with a special, infrequent source
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